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Articles
Contract-Based Post-Sale Restrictions on
Patented Products Following Quanta
Alfred C. Server* and William J. Casey**
Supreme Court decisions regarding the doctrine of patent exhaustion have drawn a bright
line for determining when patent exhaustion occurs. If a sale of a patented product is
authorized, exhaustion occurs. If a sale is not authorized, there is no exhaustion and
patent remedies remain available to the patent holder to enforce a breach of a contractual
restriction placed by the patent holder on the buyer of its patented product. But a lack of
precision in the Supreme Court’s patent exhaustion jurisprudence has resulted in
uncertainty regarding the scope and impact of patent exhaustion. Specifically, questions
persist as to whether a patent holder can preserve its patent infringement remedies by
placing a contract-based restriction on a buyer’s use or disposition of its patented product
as a condition of the sale of the product and whether breach of contract remedies remain
available to a patent holder if an authorized first sale is made and exhaustion occurs.
The Supreme Court’s failure to answer these questions in its latest decision regarding
patent exhaustion has prompted the Authors of this Article to seek these answers through
a review of the relevant case law, in order to provide guidance to the patent holder who
intends to control the use or distribution of its patented product following a sale. On the
basis of their review, which involves an analysis of the conflict between federal patent law
and state contract law that occurs in the context of an authorized first sale of a patented
product, the Authors contend that a patent holder is unable to preserve patent infringement
remedies by conditioning the sale of its patented product, and that contractual remedies
remain available in many cases even when patent exhaustion occurs. Further, the Authors
propose a case-by-case approach to assessing whether a contract-based post-sale
restriction on a patented product is enforceable under state contract law. This approach
involves determining whether (i) an objective of federal patent law preempts enforcement
of the contractual provision; (ii) the inclusion of the provision in a contract constitutes
patent misuse; (iii) the provision violates federal antitrust law; and (iv) public policy
considerations (that is, regarding public health and safety) militate in favor of enforcing
the restriction. The Authors conclude by noting that the distinction between patent
remedies and contract remedies has diminished in the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent
ruling that the proper test for the granting of an injunction upon a finding of patent
infringement is the traditional four-factor test used for non-patent causes of action.
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Introduction
1
In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., the Supreme
Court provided its latest interpretation of the patent exhaustion doctrine.
The Quanta Court held that the authorized first sale of a patented
product exhausts the patent rights substantially embodied in the product,
eliminating patent infringement remedies with respect to the product
2
based on those rights. The Court left unanswered, however, the
questions of whether a patent holder can preserve its patent infringement
remedies by placing a contract-based restriction on the buyer of its
patented product as a condition of sale and whether breach of contract
remedies are still available to the patent holder if an authorized first sale
exhausts patent infringement remedies. In this Article we address these
questions, which require a balancing of the policy considerations that
inform the federal patent laws against the dictates of state contract law.
In Part I, we discuss the nature and scope of the patent exhaustion
doctrine. We begin with a brief history of the doctrine, as articulated by
the Supreme Court, including a discussion of the various rationales that
have been offered as justifications for patent exhaustion. We next review
the Court’s Quanta decision. Finally, we address the current status of the
conditional sale doctrine, as articulated by the Federal Circuit in
3
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc. According to the conditional sale
doctrine, a patent holder can preserve its patent infringement remedies
by placing a condition, in the form of an explicit contract-based post-sale
4
restriction, on the buyer of its patented product. If the conditional sale
doctrine remains good law following Quanta and a patent holder can
control the post-sale use or disposition of its product through a patent
infringement remedy, the question of whether a breach of contract
remedy is also available to the patent holder is relatively unimportant. If,
on the other hand, the authorized first sale of a patented product
exhausts patent infringement remedies, irrespective of any condition
placed on the buyer, then a patent holder who intends to maintain
control of its product following a sale must rely on the enforceability of a
breach of contract claim. The Supreme Court in Quanta failed to discuss
the Federal Circuit’s Mallinckrodt decision, leaving questions as to the
status of the conditional sale doctrine. However, on the basis of Supreme
Court precedent regarding patent exhaustion and the structure of the
Court’s argument in Quanta, we conclude that the conditional sale
doctrine is no longer good law. And even if one accepts, for the sake of
argument, that the doctrine’s status has yet to be fully resolved, there is
sufficient uncertainty regarding its continued viability following Quanta

1.
2.
3.
4.

553 U.S. 617 (2008).
Id. at 638.
976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Id. at 708–09.
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to justify a comprehensive assessment of the enforceability of post-sale
restrictions on a patented product through a breach of contract remedy.
In Part II of this Article, we undertake such an assessment. We
review arguments against the enforceability of any contract-based postsale restriction on a patented product under state contract law. We
consider whether such a restriction (i) is an impermissible attempt to
contract around patent exhaustion that is preempted under federal
patent law; (ii) is per se patent misuse, or (iii) contravenes the public
policies against restraints on alienation and restraints of trade. We
conclude that some contract-based post-sale restrictions are enforceable
under state law while others are not, depending on the nature of the
restriction, and that such restrictions should be evaluated on a case-bycase basis under a rule of reason type analysis. Next, we provide an
approach to assessing the enforceability of individual contract-based
post-sale restrictions on a patented product under state law, which
requires a determination of whether (i) an objective of federal patent law
preempts enforcement of the contractual provision; (ii) the inclusion of
the provision in a contract constitutes patent misuse; (iii) the provision
violates federal antitrust law; and (iv) public policy considerations (e.g.,
regarding public health and safety) militate in favor of enforcing the
restriction. We then apply this approach in analyzing a representative
contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product. We end this
Section by considering the impact of the Supreme Court’s recent decision
5
in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. regarding injunctive relief for
patent infringement on the relative benefit to a patent holder of a breach
of contract remedy as compared to a patent infringement remedy.

I. Patent Exhaustion Doctrine
A. A Brief History of the Doctrine
6

The Supreme Court’s 1852 decision in Bloomer v. McQuewan is
generally acknowledged as the Court’s first application of the patent
7
8
exhaustion doctrine, also called the first sale doctrine. In that case, the
holder of a patent right for the original patent term sold the right to

5. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
6. 55 U.S. 539 (1852).
7. While Bloomer v. McQuewan is generally acknowledged as the Supreme Court’s first
application of the patent exhaustion doctrine, there was no actual authorized first sale in the case. The
so-called authorized sale took place when a party that was granted the right under the applicable
patent to construct and use a patented machine legally obtained title to the machine by constructing
and using it pursuant to the granted right. Id. at 548.
8. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine
in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 487, 491 (2011) (“The first significant body of distribution
restraints law in the United States was the judge-made ‘first sale’ doctrine, often referred to as patent
‘exhaustion,’ which limited a patentee’s ability to place restrictions on a patented good after it had
been sold.”).
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9

construct and use machines covered by the patent. The purchaser of the
patent right manufactured the machines during the original term and
10
continued to use them during an extension of the patent term. The
holder of the patent for the extended term sued the purchaser for
11
infringement. The Court rejected the patent infringement claim, ruling
that the purchaser gained ownership of the machines made during the
original term and, thereby, exhausted the right of the owner of the patent
12
for the extended term to control the purchaser’s use of the machines.
The Court reasoned that “when the machine passes to the hands of the
13
purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly” created by
Congress in enacting the federal patent laws. In the 160 years since the
McQuewan decision, the Court has reconsidered the meaning and scope
of the patent exhaustion doctrine on at least eighteen occasions. While a
discussion of each of these cases is beyond the scope of this Article, they
14
are listed for reference in Table 1. In this brief history of the doctrine,
we focus only on those cases that are critical to the issues addressed in
this Article.
Following its McQuewan decision, the Court’s next significant
15
endorsement of the exhaustion doctrine came in Adams v. Burke. The
case involved an alleged territorial restriction on the use of patented
16
coffin lids. Burke, an undertaker, purchased some of the coffin lids from
the owner of the patent right to make, sell, and use them within a ten17
mile radius of the city of Boston. Burke used the lids for their intended
18
purpose in the town of Natick, which is seventeen miles from Boston.
Adams, the assignee of the remaining patent rights, sued Burke for
infringement based on Burke’s use of the patented lids in the territory

9. McQuewan, 55 U.S. at 548.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 549–51.
13. Id. at 549.
14. Table 1 lists the Supreme Court cases that consider whether a restriction on a patented
product is enforceable through a patent infringement remedy following an alleged transfer of title to
the product. The term “patent holder” refers to the holder of the right conferred by the issuance of a
U.S. patent (whether the original patentee, an assignee, or a conveyee) to exclude others from making
and selling a product that is covered by or substantially embodies the applicable patent, as opposed to
a licensee under the patent, such as a “manufacturing licensee” that has been granted the right by the
patent holder to make and sell the patented product. The Supreme Court’s decisions in E. Bement &
Sons v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902), and United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S.
476 (1926), are frequently included in discussions of the Court’s patent exhaustion jurisprudence.
These cases, however, solely addressed the enforceability of a restriction placed by a patent holder on
a manufacturing licensee and did not consider a restriction placed on the buyer of a patented product.
Moreover, Bement was a breach of contract case that did not involve a patent infringement claim.
15. 84 U.S. 453 (1873).
16. Id. at 453–54.
17. Id. at 454–55.
18. Id.
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19

assigned to Adams. The Court rejected the infringement claim on the
grounds that the authorized first sale of the coffin lids to Burke
exhausted any patent rights with respect to the purchased lids.
The Court’s brief opinion in Adams is noteworthy because it provided
language that spawned a number of justifications for patent exhaustion,
based on arguments that are often overlapping and, occasionally, in
conflict. The Adams Court relied on the holding in McQuewan to
conclude that “when the patentee, or the person having his rights, sells a
machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use, . . . he parts with the
right to restrict that use [because] [t]he article . . . passes without the limit
20
of the monopoly.” This is a per se rule that holds that an authorized first
sale of a patented product, which transfers title to the product to the
buyer, moves the product outside of the scope of the patent monopoly
and, therefore, exhausts the patent rights with respect to that product. As
will be demonstrated in Part I.B, this bright-line rule was emphatically
endorsed by the Supreme Court in its recent Quanta decision.
The Court in Adams, however, embellished the McQuewan “outside
of the patent monopoly” rationale by focusing on the consideration
received by an authorized seller in the sale of its patented product. As
the Court stated,
the patentee or his assignee having in the act of sale received all the
royalty or consideration which he claims for the use of his invention in
that particular machine or instrument, it is open to the use of the
purchaser without further restriction on account of the monopoly of
21
the patentees.

This language has been interpreted as reflecting the view that once a
patent holder has received its reward for its invention through the sale of
a product embodying that invention, the purpose of the federal patent
statute to encourage innovation for the public good has been satisfied.
As the Supreme Court noted in a subsequent decision referencing its
Adams holding, “once that purpose is realized the patent law affords no
22
basis for restraining the use and enjoyment of the thing sold.”
Exhaustion of the patent right following an authorized first sale for
consideration is consistent with the view that the statutory monopoly
conferred upon an inventor through the issuance of a patent should be
limited and of no greater scope or duration than that required to meet
the federal patent system’s goal “to promote invention while at the same
23
time preserving free competition.”
The Supreme Court’s language in Adams regarding a patentee’s
reward, however, has been interpreted differently by the courts over the

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id. at 456.
Id.
United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942).
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230–31 (1964).
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years. According to one view, the single reward interpretation, a patent
holder who sells its patented product is entitled to a single payment at
the time of the sale and, upon receipt of that consideration, its right to
exert downstream control over the buyer’s use or disposition of the
product through the threat of a patent infringement claim ends as a result
of patent exhaustion. The Supreme Court expressed this view in Hobbie
25
v. Jennison, endorsing “the true interpretation of the decision in Adams
26
v. Burke.” In the words of the Hobbie Court, “when the patentee, or the
person having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole value
is in its use, he receives the consideration for its use and parts with the
27
right to restrict that use.”
However, an alternative interpretation has been suggested, most
recently by the Federal Circuit in its decisions in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.
28
29
Medipart, Inc. and B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories.
According to that view, a patent holder can request a payment from its
buyer that is less than the full value of the patent rights embodied in the
product sold. By so doing, the patent holder is able to retain some of the
rights in the product, which are made known to the buyer in the form of
a contract-based restriction on the buyer’s post-sale use or disposition of
the product. A violation of this restriction by the buyer can be remedied
through a patent infringement claim. As the Federal Circuit noted in its
Braun decision, the exhaustion doctrine “does not apply to an expressly
conditional sale . . . . In such a transaction, it is more reasonable to infer
that the parties negotiated a price that reflects only the value of the ‘use’
30
rights conferred by the patentee.” In essence, the patent holder can tailor
the consideration demanded for the sale of its product to match the value
of the rights transferred to the buyer. The question as to which of these
conflicting interpretations of the consideration rationale for patent
exhaustion (single reward versus tailored consideration) is correct is still
being debated and is specifically addressed in Part II.B.2 below.
The Court in Adams offered yet another rationale for the patent
exhaustion doctrine when it held “that the sale by a person [of a patented
machine] who has the full right to make, sell, and use such a machine
24. The single reward interpretation of patent exhaustion is also discussed in Part II.B.2 infra.
25. 149 U.S. 355 (1893).
26. Id. at 361.
27. Id. at 361–62. In Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. 340, 350 (1863), the Supreme Court expressed a
similar view in stating that patentees “are entitled to but one royalty for a patented machine, and
consequently when a patentee has himself constructed the machine and sold it, or authorized another
to construct and sell it, . . . and the consideration has been paid to him for the right, he has then to that
extent parted with his monopoly, and ceased to have any interest whatever in the machine so
sold . . . .”; see LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., No. C 01-00326 CW, 2002 WL 31996860, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2002) (“The [patent exhaustion] doctrine is designed to prevent a patentee
from receiving a double royalty on a single patented invention.”).
28. 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
29. 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
30. Id. at 1426; see infra note 146.
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carries with it the right to the use of that machine to the full extent to which
31
it can be used.” In effect, the Court articulated the implied license
rationale for patent exhaustion, which holds that the authorized first sale
of a patented product is accompanied by an implied license to use and
dispose of the product free from downstream control by the patent
holder. This rationale has been repeated in subsequent Supreme Court
32
opinions regarding patent exhaustion. However, the validity of this
33
argument has been questioned, and, as discussed in the following Part,
34
the Supreme Court rejected the implied license rationale in Quanta.
The various justifications for patent exhaustion reflected in the
Court’s opinion in Adams are echoed, albeit inconsistently, in subsequent
Supreme Court decisions addressing the doctrine. In fact, the Court’s
Adams opinion provides the first glimpse of the confusion as to policy
rationale that has come to characterize the Supreme Court’s patent
exhaustion jurisprudence. This confusion has been the source of
significant uncertainty among commentators and the courts with respect
to the proper application of the doctrine.
The Supreme Court’s next important ruling on patent exhaustion
35
was issued in Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co. In that case the Court
held that the authorized first sale of patented beds by the owner of the
rights to the patent in the state of Michigan exhausted all of the patent
36
rights embodied in the beds. The effect of the exhaustion was to bar a
patent infringement claim brought by the owner of the patent rights in
the state of Massachusetts against a buyer who purchased the beds in

31. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 455 (1873) (emphasis added).
32. See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942) (observing that an authorized
sale is “both a complete transfer of ownership … and a license to practice” the patented invention); see
infra notes 71–79 and accompanying text discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Univis; see also
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9, Quanta Computer, Inc. v.
LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (No. 06-937), 2007 WL 3353102 (“[A]n authorized sale of a
patented article grants an implied-in-law license under patent law to practice the patent. As Adams
explained, this Court’s first-sale cases rest on the principle that ‘the sale by a person who has the full
right to make, sell, and use such a machine carries with it the right to the use of that machine to the full
extent to which it can be used.’” (citation omitted)).
33. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry,
89 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 31–32 (2001); John W. Osborne, A Coherent View of Patent Exhaustion: A
Standard Based on Patentable Distinctiveness, 20 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 643, 687–
91 (2004); see also LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., C 01-00326 CW, 2002 WL 31996860 *3–4
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2002) (“The patent exhaustion doctrine . . . is derived from the statutory grant of
exclusivity to the patentee. . . . The implied license doctrine, on the other hand, derives not from
statute, but from principles of equity. . . . Although similar in effect, the doctrines require distinct
analysis. To determine if a patent was exhausted, the court must assess whether the terms of the
patentee’s sale remove the invention from the protection of the patent law. The determination of
whether an implied license exists, however, is necessarily more fact specific. The court must determine
whether the patentee’s acts led the accused infringer to believe it had acquired the right to practice the
patented invention.”).
34. See infra Part I.B.1.
35. 157 U.S. 659 (1895).
36. Id. at 666.
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Michigan but resold them in Massachusetts. The significance of the case
for our purposes is that it provides the first clear articulation by the
Supreme Court of the question that is the focus of this Article, namely, is
a contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product enforceable
through a breach of contract remedy, despite the absence of a patent
infringement remedy as a result of exhaustion? In raising, but not
answering, this question the Keeler Court stated the following:
[O]ne who buys patented articles of manufacture from one authorized
to sell them becomes possessed of an absolute property in such articles,
unrestricted in time or place. Whether a patentee may protect himself
and his assignees by special contracts brought home to the purchasers
is not a question before us, and upon which we express no opinion. It
is, however, obvious that such a question would arise as a question of
contract, and not as one under the inherent meaning and effect of the
38
patent laws.

We will revisit this language below in Part II.A of this Article.
39
The Court’s decision in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co. (overruled in
40
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co. ) is a
true outlier in the Supreme Court’s patent exhaustion jurisprudence. The
case involved the sale of a patented rotary mimeograph machine by the
patentee in which the buyer was obligated, as indicated by a notice
attached to the machine, to only use unpatented stencil paper and ink
41
made by the patentee in the operation of the machine. Despite the
authorized first sale of the patented machine, the Court held that the
relevant patents were not exhausted and that the post-sale restriction
placed on the buyer was enforceable through a patent infringement
42
remedy. The Court distinguished its prior decisions in which an
authorized first sale resulted in patent exhaustion as involving
unconditional sales in which the seller placed no post-sale restriction on
43
the buyer with respect to the product sold. It relied on a variation of the
implied license rationale for patent exhaustion to argue that a seller can
retain some of its patent rights with respect to a product if the sale is
44
made subject to a condition known to the buyer. Quoting from a
recognized treatise on patent law, the Henry Court held that “any person
having the right to sell may at the time of sale restrict the use of his
vendee within specific boundaries of time or place or method, and these
37. Id. at 667.
38. Id. at 666.
39. 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
40. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
41. Henry, 224 U.S. at 11.
42. Id. at 24–25.
43. Id. at 19 (“In the cases cited above [including Mitchell, Adams, and Keeler], the statement that
a purchaser of a patented machine has an unlimited right to use it for all the purposes of the invention,
so long as the identity of the machine is preserved, was made of one who bought unconditionally, that
is, subject to no specified limitation upon his right of use.”).
44. Id. at 23–24.
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will then become the measure of the implied license arising from the
45
sale.” In other words, while an unconditional authorized first sale of a
patented product carries with it an unrestricted implied license granted
to the buyer to use or dispose of the product and in that sense exhausts
the patent right, an authorized first sale that is conditioned by means of
an express restriction placed on the buyer limits the scope of the implied
license and the extent of the exhaustion.
The Henry Court provided a second justification for its ruling by
adopting the tailored consideration rationale for patent exhaustion,
discussed above. Recall that, according to this rationale, a patent holder
that sells its product can request a payment that is less than a full value of
the patent rights embodied in the product and, thereby, retain some of its
rights in the product that are made known to the buyer through an express
condition of the sale. As the Court in Henry explained,
the patentee sold its machines at cost, or less, and depended upon the
profit realized from the sale of other non-patented articles adapted to
be used with the machine, and . . . it had put out many thousands of
such machines under the same license restriction. Such a sale, while
transferring the property right in the machine, carries with it only the
right to use it for practicing the invention according to the terms of the
license. To no other or greater extent does the patentee consent to the
use of the machine. When the purchaser is sued for infringement by
using the device, he may defend by pleading, not the general and
unlimited license which is carried by an unconditional sale, but the
limited license indicated by the metal tablet annexed to the machine. If
46
the use is not one permitted, it is plainly an infringing use.

The Court in Henry bolstered its argument that a conditioned
authorized sale limits patent exhaustion by citing its prior decisions in
47
48
Mitchell v. Hawley and Bement v. National Harrow Co., in which the
Court had ruled that the product-related restriction under consideration
was enforceable. However, the sales in those cases were not authorized
by the patent holder. In fact, the Henry Court had to look to a prior Sixth
Circuit decision in Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka
49
Specialty Co. for a fact pattern similar to that in Henry in which the
conditioning of an authorized first sale preserved a patent infringement

45. Id. at 24 (quoting 2 Robinson on Patents § 824).
46. Id. at 26.
47. 83 U.S. 544 (1872).
48. 186 U.S. 70 (1902). Note that Bement was a breach of contract case that did not involve a
patent infringement claim. It solely addressed the enforceability of a restriction placed by a patent
holder on a manufacturing licensee and did not consider a restriction placed on the buyer of a
patented product. The Court in Henry relied on it for the proposition that ‘“with few exceptions, . . .
any conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to this kind of [patented
intellectual] property, imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the right to
manufacture or use or sell the article, will be upheld by the courts. The fact that the conditions in the
contracts keep up the [patentee’s] monopoly . . . does not render them illegal.’” Henry v. A.B. Dick
Co., 224 U.S. 1, 30 (1912) (quoting Bement, 186 U.S. at 91).
49. 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896).
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remedy, and the same judge (Lurton) delivered the opinion of the court
in both cases.
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Henry was overruled in
50
Motion Picture Patents, the so-called conditional sale doctrine endorsed
in Henry was resurrected by the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt and
51
Braun. There is uncertainty, however, as to the continued viability of
the doctrine in the wake of the Supreme Court’s Quanta decision. We
discuss the status of the conditional sale doctrine and its relevance to the
question of whether a contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented
product can be enforced through a breach of contract remedy in Part I.C.
Following its decision in Henry, the Supreme Court issued four
opinions regarding patent exhaustion that undermined and ultimately
52
overruled its holding in Henry: Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, Straus v.
53
Victor Talking Machine Co., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal
54
Film Manufacturing Co., and Boston Store of Chicago v. American
55
Graphophone Co. Aspects of these decisions are discussed elsewhere in
this Article. Collectively, they are remarkable for the following shared
features: In each of these cases the Court found that (i) the relevant
patent was exhausted following an authorized first sale of a patented
product, despite an express condition placed upon, and known to, the
buyer in the form of a restriction as to the post-sale use or disposition of
the product; (ii) as a result of the exhaustion, the post-sale restriction
placed on the buyer was not enforceable through a patent infringement
remedy; and (iii) the post-sale restriction under consideration, which
placed either a tying or price-fixing obligation on the buyer, was void as
constituting patent misuse and/or in violation of competition law.
The Supreme Court relied primarily on McQuewan’s “outside the
patent monopoly” rationale for patent exhaustion in deciding these four
56
cases. However, the Court in these cases addressed another consideration
that has been used as a justification for patent exhaustion, namely, the
public policies against restraints of alienation and restraints of trade. As
the Court noted in Straus,
50. 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917) (“It is obvious that the conclusions arrived at in this opinion are such
that the decision in Henry v. Dick Co. . . . must be regarded as overruled.”).
51. See William LaFuze et al., The Conditional Sale Doctrine in a Post-Quanta World and Its
Implications on Modern Licensing Agreements, 11 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 295 (2011).
52. 229 U.S. 1 (1913).
53. 243 U.S. 490 (1917).
54. 243 U.S. 502.
55. 246 U.S. 8 (1918).
56. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852). The Court’s position was, perhaps, best
expressed in its Bauer decision when it stated that, following the authorized first sale of a patented
product, the “right to vend conferred by the patent law has been exercised, and the added restriction is
beyond the protection and purpose of the act. This being so, the case is brought within that line of
cases in which this court from the beginning has held that a patentee who has parted with a patented
machine by passing title to a purchaser has placed the article beyond the limits of the monopoly
secured by the patent act.” 229 U.S. at 17.
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[c]ourts would be perversely blind if they failed to look through such
an attempt as this ‘License Notice’ thus plainly is to sell property for a
full price, and yet to place restraints upon its further alienation, such as
have been hateful to the law from Lord Coke’s day to ours, because
57
obnoxious to the public interest.

In Motion Picture Patents, the Court stated that
it is not competent for the owner of a patent by notice attached to its
machine to, in effect, extend the scope of its patent monopoly by
restricting the use of it to materials necessary in its operation but which
are no part of the patented invention, or to send its machines forth into
the channels of trade of the country subject to conditions as to use or
royalty to be paid to be imposed thereafter at the discretion of such
patent owner. The patent law furnishes no warrant for such a practice
and the cost, inconvenience and annoyance to the public which the
58
opposite conclusion would occasion forbid it.

We discuss this policy rationale further in Part II.A.3.
59
General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co. was the next
important patent exhaustion case decided by the Supreme Court.
American Telephone and Telegraph Company (the “Telephone
Company”) owned various patents that covered amplifiers used for homeuse radio reception and for reproducing sound for movie equipment in
60
theaters. The Telephone Company authorized its agent to grant a
nonexclusive license under its patents to American Transformer Company
(the “Transformer Company”) to manufacture and sell amplifiers covered
61
by the patents for radio reception only. The license agreement was
explicit in limiting the scope of the grant to sales to private radio users
62
and not for commercial use in theaters. Despite the restriction, the
Transformer Company sold amplifiers to General Talking Pictures
Corporation (“GTP”), knowing that GTP intended to use the amplifiers
63
in theaters. GTP was made aware of the limitation on the Transformer
Company’s right to sell the amplifiers through a notice affixed to the
64
machines indicating that they were for private use only. Western
Electric Company (“Western”), which had been granted the exclusive
right to sell the covered amplifiers for commercial use in theaters, sued
65
GTP for patent infringement. The Court concluded that both the
66
Transformer Company and GTP had infringed the patents at issue. In
manufacturing the amplifiers for, and selling them to, GTP for

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

243 U.S. at 500–01.
243 U.S. at 516.
304 U.S. 175 (1938), reh’g at 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
Gen. Talking Pictures, 304 U.S. at 179.
Id. at 179–80.
Id. at 180.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 181–82.
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commercial use, the Transformer Company was acting outside of the
67
scope of its license grant. Accordingly, the sale made by the
Transformer Company was an infringing (and not authorized) sale that
did not exhaust the patent infringement remedy that Western sought
68
from the Transformer Company. GTP, which had purchased the
amplifiers with the knowledge that the sale by the Transformer Company
was not authorized, infringed the patents through its commercial use of
69
the amplifiers.
The Court’s decision in General Talking Pictures is instructive for
several reasons. First, it was the Court’s clearest demonstration to date of
an infringing sale of a patented product in a case addressing patent
exhaustion. The business arrangement under consideration was carefully
detailed by the Court so as to highlight the fact that the sale of the
patented product was made by a manufacturing licensee acting outside of
70
the scope of a validly restricted license grant. Second, the Court
distinguished between a restriction placed by a patent holder on its
manufacturing licensee and a restriction placed on the buyer of a patented
product. And third, the Court confirmed that only a first sale that is
authorized by the holder of the patent right (as opposed to an infringing
sale) triggers exhaustion that renders a post-sale restriction on the buyer
of the patented product unenforceable through a patent infringement
remedy.
Considering our view that General Talking Pictures is a pivotal case
for interpreting the Supreme Court’s patent exhaustion jurisprudence, it
is particularly noteworthy that the Federal Circuit relied on the case in
Mallinckrodt to resurrect the conditional sale doctrine originally endorsed
in Henry. There is a clear distinction, however, between the infringing sale
that occurred in General Talking Pictures and an authorized first sale
accompanied by a condition on the buyer that occurred in both Henry and
Mallinckrodt. As we will argue in Part I.C, Supreme Court case law
makes clear that the former does not exhaust patent infringement
remedies while the latter does. Suffice it to say at this point that through
application of the principles set forth in General Talking Pictures,
seemingly contradictory Supreme Court decisions regarding patent
exhaustion can be reconciled, with the exception of Henry which was
overruled by Motion Picture Patents.

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 182.
70. 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938) (“As the restriction was legal and the amplifiers were made and sold
outside the scope of the license the effect is precisely the same as if no license whatsoever had been
granted to Transformer Company. And as Pictures Corporation [GTP] knew the facts, it is in no better
position than if it had manufactured the amplifiers itself without a license. It is liable because it has
used the invention without license to do so.”).
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71

United States v. Univis Lens Co. was the Supreme Court’s last
significant patent exhaustion opinion prior to its Quanta decision. The
case involved a licensing system by means of which the holder of patents
relating to multifocal lenses for eyeglasses controlled the prices at which
72
the lenses were sold. Univis Lens Company (“Univis”) was licensed by
the patent holder to manufacture and sell lens blanks to designated
licensees of the patent holder for finishing and resale, at prices specified
73
by the patent holder, for use in eyeglasses. The federal government
challenged the licensing system as an unlawful restraint of trade under
74
the Sherman Act that was not within the protection of the patent laws.
The Supreme Court found for the government on the basis of its
conclusion that the authorized first sale of the lens blanks by Univis
exhausted the patent monopoly with respect to the lenses—rendering the
resale price restriction placed on a buyer of the lenses void as a violation
75
of antitrust law. Central to the Court’s ruling was its determination that
the authorized sale of a lens blank, which embodied the essential features
of the patented invention and whose only use was as a multifocal lens for
eyeglasses when finished in accordance with the patent, exhausted the
relevant patents with respect to both the blank and the finished lens,
despite the fact that the finishing of the lens was to be performed by the
76
buyer of the blank.
As in Adams, the Supreme Court in Univis relied on multiple
justifications for patent exhaustion to rule that the post-sale restriction
under consideration in the case was not enforceable through a patent
infringement remedy. The Univis Court adopted McQuewan’s “outside
of the patent monopoly” rationale in stating that the “first vending of any
article manufactured under a patent puts the article beyond the reach of
77
the monopoly which that patent confers.” In addition, the Court
endorsed Adams’s focus on the consideration received by a patent holder
from a product sale by noting that

71. 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
72. Id. at 243–44.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 242–43.
75. Id. at 250 (“The patentee may surrender his monopoly in whole by the sale of his patent or in
part by the sale of an article embodying the invention. His monopoly remains so long as he retains the
ownership of the patented article. But sale of it exhausts the monopoly in that article and the patentee
may not thereafter, by virtue of his patent, control the use or disposition of the article. Hence the
patentee cannot control the resale price of patented articles which he has sold, either by resort to an
infringement suit, or, consistently with the Sherman Act . . . by stipulating for price maintenance by his
vendees.” (citation omitted)).
76. Id. at 250–51 (“[W]here one has sold an uncompleted article which, because it embodies
essential features of his patented invention, is within the protection of his patent, and has destined the
article to be finished by the purchaser in conformity to the patent, he has sold his invention so far as it
is or may be embodied in that particular article.”).
77. Id. at 252.
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[o]ur decisions have uniformly recognized that the purpose of the
patent law is fulfilled with respect to any particular article when the
patentee has received his reward for the use of his invention by the sale
of the article, and that once that purpose is realized the patent law
affords no basis for restraining the use and enjoyment of the thing
78
sold.

Finally, the Univis Court looked to the implied license rationale for patent
exhaustion to support its ruling in the case. In the words of the Court,
[a]n incident to the purchase of any article, whether patented or
unpatented, is the right to use and sell it, and upon familiar principles
the authorized sale of an article which is capable of use only in
practicing the patent is a relinquishment of the patent monopoly with
respect to the article sold. Sale of a lens blank by the patentee or by his
licensee is thus in itself both a complete transfer of ownership of the
blank, which is within the protection of the patent law, and a license to
79
practice the final stage of the patent procedure.

The Supreme Court’s reliance on multiple rationales for patent
exhaustion in its Univis decision was consistent with the Court’s prior
approach to justifying the doctrine and left the various rationales
available for reconsideration by the Court in Quanta.
B. QUANTA
1. The Supreme Court’s Decision
80

In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics., Inc., the Supreme
Court issued its latest opinion on patent exhaustion. LG Electronics
81
(“LGE”) owned a portfolio of patents related to computer systems.
82
LGE licensed its patents to Intel Corporation (“Intel”). The license
agreement authorized “Intel to make, use, sell (directly or indirectly),
offer to sell, import or otherwise dispose of its own products practicing
83
the [licensed] patents” (the “Licensed Intel Products”). The license
agreement also had a clause that attempted to prevent the license from

78. Id. at 251.
79. Id. at 249 (citation omitted).
80. 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
81. See id. at 621–23. Three patents were at issue in the case. Id. at 621. U.S. Patent No. 4,939,641
(’641) covers a system that “ensur[es] that the most current data are retrieved from main memory by
monitoring data requests and updating main memory from the cache when stale data are requested.”
Id. at 622 (citing LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). U.S.
Patent No. 5,379,379 (’379) covers an efficient manner of coordinating “requests to read from, and
write to, main memory.” Id. (citing LG Elecs., 453 F.3d at 1378). U.S. Patent No. 5,077,733 (’733)
covers methods of rotating data traffic among multiple computer components to ensure no one
component’s usage dominates while giving heavy users priority. Id. at 622–23 (citing Order Construing
Disputed Terms and Phrases at 37–38, LG Elecs. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., No. C01-02187 (N.D.
Cal., Aug. 20, 2002)).
82. Id. at 623.
83. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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84

extending to third party buyers. But, the license agreement noted that it
was not intended to modify the principles of patent exhaustion in any
85
way. In a separate master agreement, Intel agreed to provide written
notice to its buyers that Intel’s license from LGE did not extend to
products made “by combining an Intel product with any non-Intel
86
product.”
Quanta Computer (“Quanta”) purchased microprocessors and
chipsets, each a Licensed Intel Product, from Intel and combined them
87
with non-Intel memory and buses. LGE’s patents covered the
combination, but Quanta combined the Intel and non-Intel products
despite Intel’s provision of the notice required by the master
88
agreement. LGE then asserted its patents against Quanta while Quanta
argued that Intel’s sale to Quanta exhausted any patent rights LGE had
89
in the combined product.
The Court held that patent exhaustion applied and that LGE had no
90
patent remedy it could use to seek redress against Quanta. In discussing
91
the exhaustion doctrine, the Court emphasized several of its precedents
to reinforce the basic tenet that an authorized first sale of a patented
product exhausts a patent holder’s rights in the patent with respect to
that product. First, the Court noted that following such a sale, post-sale
restrictions on the use or disposition of the product are not enforceable
92
through a patent infringement remedy. Next, the Court referenced
McQuewan’s “outside of the patent monopoly” rationale as the
93
justification for patent exhaustion. Finally, citing its decision in Univis,
the Court emphasized that patent exhaustion applies “following the sale of
an item . . . when the item sufficiently embodies the patent—even if it does

84. Id. (“[The agreement] stipulates that no license is granted by either party hereto . . . to any
third party for the combination by a third party of Licensed Products of either party with items,
components, or the like acquired . . . from sources other than a party hereto, or for the use, import,
offer for sale or sale of such combination.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
85. Id. (“[N]otwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement, the parties
agree that nothing herein shall in any way limit or alter the effect of patent exhaustion that would
otherwise apply when a party hereto sells any of its Licensed Products.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
86. Id. at 624.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 638.
91. See id. at 625–28. In reviewing the history of the patent exhaustion doctrine, the Court in
Quanta discussed its prior decisions in McQuewan, Adams, Henry, Bauer, Motion Picture Patents, and
Univis.
92. See id. at 625–26. The Court noted that after briefly permitting the enforcement of post-sale
restrictions through a patent infringement remedy in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), it
overruled that decision in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
93. Id. at 625 (“[W]hen the machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within
the limits of the monopoly.” (quoting Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1853))).

April 2013]

CONTRACT-BASED POST-SALE RESTRICTIONS

577

not completely practice the patent—such that its only and intended use is
94
to be finished under the terms of the patent.”
Before addressing whether the sale under consideration in the case
was an authorized first sale that exhausted the patent, the Quanta Court
considered whether exhaustion applies to method claims and whether
the Licensed Intel Products substantially embodied the patents. First, the
95
Court held that patent exhaustion does apply to method claims. It based
96
this holding on Court precedent, as well as the policy rationale that
97
clever claim drafters would draft method claims to avoid exhaustion.
Second, the Court held that an “authorized sale of an article which is
capable of use only in practicing the patent is a relinquishment of the
98
patent monopoly with respect to the article sold.” Since only common
processes or standard parts were required to practice the LGE patents
after Intel’s sale of the Licensed Intel Products, the Court found that
Intel’s microprocessors and chipsets substantially embodied the LGE
99
patents. Further, the Court addressed when substantial embodiment
occurs by noting that the inventive part of the patents in this case was in
the design of the Licensed Intel Products and not their combination with
100
memory and buses.
Finally, the Court addressed whether Intel’s sale was an authorized
sale that exhausted the patent and held that the sale was authorized and
101
exhaustion did apply. In coming to this determination, the Court rejected
LGE’s argument that Intel was not authorized to sell Licensed Intel
102
Products to buyers for “use in combination with non-Intel products.”
Instead, the Court noted that the license agreement did not restrict
94. Id. at 628.
95. Id. at 629 (“[T]his Court has repeatedly held that method patents were exhausted by the sale
of an item that embodied the method.”).
96. Id. (“In Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, for example, the Court held that the sale of a
motor fuel produced under one patent also exhausted the patent for a method of using the fuel in
combustion motors. Similarly, . . . Univis held that the sale of optical lens blanks that partially
practiced a patent exhausted the method patents that were not completely practiced until the blanks
were ground into lenses.” (citation omitted)).
97. Id. at 629–30. (“Eliminating exhaustion for method patents would seriously undermine the
exhaustion doctrine. Patentees seeking to avoid patent exhaustion could simply draft their patent claims
to describe a method rather than an apparatus . . . . By characterizing their claims as method instead of
apparatus claims, or including a method claim for the machine’s patented method of performing its task, a
patent drafter could shield practically any patented item from exhaustion.”).
98. Id. at 631 (quoting United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942)).
99. Id. at 633 (“Like the Univis lens blanks, the Intel Products constitute a material part of the
patented invention and all but completely practice the patent. Here, as in Univis, the incomplete
article substantially embodies the patent because the only step necessary to practice the patent is the
application of common processes or the addition of standard parts. Everything inventive about each
patent is embodied in the Intel Products.”).
100. Id. at 635 (“In this case, the inventive part of the patent is not the fact that memory and buses
are combined with a microprocessor or chipset; rather, it is included in the design of the Intel Products
themselves and the way these products access the memory or bus.”).
101. Id. at 635–37.
102. Id. at 636.
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Intel’s ability to sell to buyers intending to combine the Licensed Intel
103
Products with non-Intel parts. Further, Intel provided to third party
buyers the notice that was required by the master agreement, and even if
they did not, the breach of the master agreement would not have
104
breached the license agreement. Thus, the Court found the sale to be
105
authorized by the license agreement.
It is noteworthy that the Court in Quanta rejected LGE’s argument
that Quanta had no right to combine the Licensed Intel Products with
non-Intel products because the license agreement between LGE and Intel
disclaimed any license to third parties (including Quanta) to practice the
LGE patents by combining the Intel products with non-Intel
106
components. According to the Quanta Court, this argument was relevant
to the reasoning that, in the absence of an explicit disclaimer such as the
one in the license agreement, Quanta would have been granted an implied
license under LGE’s patents to use the Licensed Intel Products with nonIntel products, but in the presence of such an explicit disclaimer, the
implied license to Quanta was limited to use of the Intel products only
107
with other Intel products. From the Court’s perspective, however, the
question at issue in the case (and Quanta’s argument in support of its
unrestricted use of the Licensed Intel Products) was not one of implied
108
license, but of patent exhaustion. In essence, the Supreme Court in
Quanta rejected the implied license rationale for patent exhaustion in
favor of the per se rule originally set forth in McQuewan that an
authorized first sale of a patented product places the product outside of
the scope of the statutorily created patent monopoly.

103. Id.
104. Id. at 636–37.
105. See id. (“LGE overlooks important aspects of the structure of the Intel-LGE transaction.
Nothing in the License Agreement restricts Intel’s right to sell its microprocessors and chipsets to
purchasers who intend to combine them with non-Intel parts. It broadly permits Intel to ‘“make, use,
[or] sell”’ products free of LGE’s patent claims. To be sure, LGE did require Intel to give notice to its
customers, including Quanta, that LGE had not licensed those customers to practice its patents. But
neither party contends that Intel breached the agreement in that respect. In any event, the provision
requiring notice to Quanta appeared only in the Master Agreement, and LGE does not suggest that a
breach of that agreement would constitute a breach of the License Agreement. Hence, Intel’s
authority to sell its products embodying the LGE Patents was not conditioned on the notice or on
Quanta’s decision to abide by LGE’s directions in that notice.” (alteration in original) (citations
omitted)).
106. Id. at 637.
107. Id.
108. Id. (“LGE points out that the License Agreement specifically disclaimed any license to third
parties to practice the patents by combining licensed products with other components. But the
question whether third parties received implied licenses is irrelevant because Quanta asserts its right
to practice the patents based not on implied license but on exhaustion. And exhaustion turns only on
Intel’s own license to sell products practicing the LGE Patents.” (citation omitted)).
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2. A Critique of the Decision
The Supreme Court’s Quanta decision has been the subject of
109
110
numerous commentaries and scholarly reviews. Foremost among the
criticisms that have been leveled at the decision are the following: (i) The
Quanta decision endorses a per se rule for patent exhaustion, in the
absence of a clear and compelling policy rationale; (ii) the decision rests
upon formalistic line drawing that permits a patent holder, through an
appropriate business arrangement and careful contract drafting, to
circumvent patent exhaustion; and (iii) the Court’s opinion in the case
leaves unanswered critical questions regarding the fate of Mallinckrodt’s
conditional sale doctrine and the enforceability of a contract-based postsale restriction on a patented product through a breach of contract
remedy.
a.

A Per Se Rule That Lacks a Clear and Compelling Policy
Rationale

The Supreme Court in Quanta concluded that “[t]he authorized sale
of an article that substantially embodies a patent exhausts the patent
holder’s rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking patent law to
111
control post-sale use of the article.” This bright-line rule mandates the
exhaustion of any patent substantially embodied in a product following the
product’s authorized first sale by the patent holder or its licensee. While
application of the rule may present a challenge as to which patent is
112
exhausted by the sale, the rule has simplicity and finality to commend it.

109. See Eileen McDermott, How Quanta Will Change Licensing, Managing Intell. Prop.,
July/Aug. 2008, at 74; Chris Holman, Quanta and Its Impact on Biotechnology, Holman’s Biotech IP
Blog (June 11, 2008), http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/2008/06/quanta-and-its-impact-onbiotechnology.html.
110. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 8; Thomas G. Hungar, Observations Regarding the
Supreme Court’s Decision in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 49 IDEA 517 (2009);
LaFuze et al., supra note 51; Jason McCammon, The Validity of Conditional Sales: Competing Views of
Patent Exhaustion in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008), 32 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 785 (2009); Jared Tong, Comment, You Pay for What You Get: The Argument for
Allowing Parties to Contract Around Patent Exhaustion, 46 Hous. L. Rev. 1711 (2010).
111. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 638.
112. See McDermott, supra note 109, at 76 (“Jeffrey Kushan of Sidley Austin, who represented LG
in the case, says that the Court failed to grasp the crux of the issue. ‘One thing that was not
appreciated in the Court’s decision was the relationship between the products and the patents at issue.
They didn’t connect the dots on independent patent embodiments,’ says Kushan. He adds that the
Court’s assertion that, since the chips ‘substantially embodied’ the method patents, they were subject
to exhaustion, is simply unclear. ‘We don’t know what “substantially embodied” means,’ says Kushan.
‘We don’t know how much has to be embodied—that’s an area of confusion. It doesn’t have an
objective footing.’”); Holman, supra note 109 (“I foresee difficulty as courts attempt to apply the
‘substantially embodied’ standard. For example, the Court suggests that in applying the doctrine to a
patent claiming a ‘combination invention,’ the purchased product would have to incorporate all claim
limitations to ‘substantially embody’ the patent . . . . But for other patents, wherein the inventive
element resides in only certain claim limitations (such as the LGE patents), the court will need to
identify the ‘inventive’ claim limitations and determine whether a product comprising those limitations
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The Quanta Court’s restatement of the law of patent exhaustion has
been criticized, however, as perpetuating a draconian per se rule against
113
that runs counter to the trend in
post-sale vertical restraints
competition law to evaluate such restraints with greater subtlety and to
view them more favorably. As one commentator stated,
[t]he Supreme Court missed an opportunity to make the law of postsale restraints more coherent in its recent Quanta Computer decision,
where it reverted to a strict application of the first sale rule not clearly
related to any policy of furthering competition or innovation. Until
Quanta, the case law over the last two generations had consistently
pursued two themes: a benign attitude toward vertical restraints and a
belief that IP rights are not inherently monopolistic. The Quanta
decision is a reversion to an older form of patent “exceptionalism” that
viewed post-sale restraints on patented articles as inherently
114
suspicious.

This concern regarding the Supreme Court’s latest statement on
patent exhaustion in Quanta is exacerbated by the Court’s recurring
failure to articulate a clear and compelling policy rationale in support of
the doctrine. As noted in Part I.A, the basis for this policy-related
objection to the Supreme Court’s patent exhaustion jurisprudence has its
roots in the Court’s earliest decisions regarding the doctrine. And the
Court in Quanta did little to resolve this problem. In fact, the Court’s
opinion in Quanta is remarkable for its lack of any substantive discussion
115
of the justification for patent exhaustion. While the Quanta Court
rejected the implied license rational for the doctrine, it accepted without
reexamination McQuewan’s “outside of the patent monopoly” argument
and then cited favorably subsequent decisions in Adams, Motion Picture
Patents, and Univis, each of which simply endorsed some variant of the
116
McQuewan argument. The relevance, for our purposes, of the Court’s

‘embodies’ the patent. The court might also need to address the question of whether the purchaser’s
use of the product required ‘creative or inventive decisions,’ or whether any additional parts added to
the product to arrive at the patented invention are ‘standard.’”).
113. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 539 (“[The Quanta opinion endorses] a draconian rule that
prohibits every post-sale restraint without any inquiry into the nature or likely effects of the
challenged restriction.”); id. at 541 (“The worst problem of the first sale rule is that it lacks subtlety.
To be sure, there is a set of technical rules that determines when a qualifying ‘sale’ of a patented . . .
good has occurred. However, once such a sale is found enforcement of the post-sale restraint is denied
automatically, with no consideration of the restraint’s purpose or effect.”); id. at 546 (“The Supreme
Court[’s] . . . position in Quanta seems excessively draconian, yielding a per se rule against a practice
that was not clearly shown to be more harmful than its alternatives.”); see also McCammon, supra note
110, at 796 (“Indeed, much of the language in the [Quanta] opinion cuts in favor of a broad reach for
patent exhaustion (something close to a per se rule) and against a reasonableness inquiry.”).
114. Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 492 (footnote omitted).
115. See id. at 502 (“The [Quanta] opinion failed to articulate any rationale for the doctrine other
than naked precedent and stare decisis. The Court largely ignored the historical concern with
restraints on alienated or the later concerns with competition policy.”); id. at 540 (“Without stating
any policy argument for its preservation, the Supreme Court nevertheless soundly reaffirmed the first
sale doctrine in its 2008 Quanta decision.”); see also infra note 327.
116. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625–28, 637 (2008).
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failure to provide a clear justification for patent exhaustion is that it adds
to the challenge of answering a central question addressed in this
Article—that is, does the enforcement of a post-sale restriction on a
patented product through a breach of contract remedy constitute an
impermissible attempt to “contract-around” the underlying purpose of
the patent exhaustion doctrine? As will be argued in Part II, answering
this question involves a balancing of the policy considerations that
underlie the exhaustion doctrine against the dictates of contract law. The
failure by the Supreme Court to offer a clear and compelling justification
for patent exhaustion complicates this balancing effort, which is required
117
when pitting the judge-made doctrine of patent exhaustion against
state contract law.
b.

Formalistic Line Drawing

A second criticism of the Supreme Court’s Quanta decision is that
the Court endorsed formalistic line drawing that permits a patent holder,
through an appropriate business arrangement and careful contract
drafting, to circumvent patent exhaustion. The rule in Quanta is that the
authorized first sale of a patented product by the patent holder or its
licensee exhausts any patent substantially embodied in the product
118
sold. In General Talking Pictures, the Court held that patent exhaustion
is avoided where a manufacturing licensee sells a product outside of the
119
scope of its license from the patent holder. Under that circumstance, the
patent holder can pursue a patent infringement remedy against a buyer
who ignores a post-sale restriction relating to the product. The Court’s
holdings in these two cases allow a patent holder, whose direct sales are by
120
and, therefore, would trigger exhaustion, to
definition authorized
preserve its patent infringement remedies by granting a restricted license
to another party to make and sell its product. As one commentator
explained,
Quanta appears to permit a patent holder to impose post-sale
restrictions on purchasers if those sales are made by a licensee, even
though the patent holder would not be able to impose the same
restrictions on a direct purchaser. Thus, for example, Quanta would
seem to bar a patent holder from selling a product under the condition
that purchasers are only permitted to use the product for personal,
non-commercial uses, and then suing purchasers who violate this

117. In Hovenkamp, supra note 8, the author provided the following comment on the difficulty of
developing a clear and compelling policy rational for a judge-made patent law doctrine: “[O]ne
significant disadvantage that judges face is that they decide disputes one at a time and often in a single
doctrinal context. This severely limits their opportunity to articulate a coherent policy about multifaceted issues such as competition policy and the encouragement of innovation.” Id. at 494.
118. Quanta Computer, 553 U.S. at 638.
119. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181–82 (1938).
120. Hungar, supra note 110, at 538 n.108 (“To be sure, the patent holder by definition cannot
make an unauthorized sale.”).

582

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:561

condition for patent infringement. However, in Talking Pictures (1938)
the Supreme Court held that a patent holder can accomplish essentially
the same result when the product is sold by a licensee. In Talking
Pictures, the patent owner authorized a licensed manufacturer to sell a
patented product solely for private use; the licensee was barred from
selling the product to commercial users. Nevertheless, some purchasers
used the product commercially, and the Supreme Court held that
because the sales were not authorized under the license patent
exhaustion did not apply; the patent owner was permitted [to] sue the
commercial purchasers for patent infringement. In Quanta, the
Supreme Court cited Talking Pictures with approval, apparently
clearing the way for a patent owner to restrict the use of a product by
sales through a licensee in a manner that would not be permitted if the
121
patent owner sold the product directly.

The above interpretation of the scope of the exhaustion doctrine
and the impact of the Court’s holding in General Talking Pictures has
122
been challenged, however, as reflecting “formalistic line drawing” that
123
“make[s] little economic sense.” The Federal Circuit relied on this
argument in Mallinckrodt to support its resurrection of the conditional
124
sale doctrine, which provides an alternative and less convoluted means
for a patent holder to preserve its patent infringement remedies through
conditioning a direct sale of its patented product by placing an express
restriction on a buyer with respect to the use or disposition of the
product. We explore this line of reasoning in Part I.C as part of a broader
assessment of the continued viability of the conditional sale doctrine
following the Supreme Court’s Quanta decision.
c.

Critical Unanswered Questions

A final criticism of the Supreme Court’s Quanta decision is that it left
in its wake critical unanswered questions regarding the fate of
Mallinckrodt’s conditional sale doctrine and the enforceability of a
contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product through a
breach of contract remedy. The Quanta Court failed to raise the first
question and raised but failed to answer the second. We devote the
remainder of this Article to providing answers to these two questions.

121. Holman, supra note 109, at *3–4.
122. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“That the viability of
the restriction should depend on how the transaction is structured was denigrated as ‘formalistic line
drawing’ . . . . [W]e discern no reason to preserve formalistic distinctions of no economic
consequence . . . .”).
123. Holman, supra note 109, at *4 (“This [ability of a patent holder to circumvent patent
exhaustion only through an intervening manufacturing licensee] is clearly an anomalous outcome, and
seems to make little economic sense. If this sort of restriction is permissible when accomplished
through a licensee, why not let the patent owner achieve the same result directly?”).
124. See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 705.
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C. Status of MALLINCKRODT’s Conditional Sale Doctrine
125

In Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit
resurrected the conditional sale doctrine originally endorsed by the
Supreme Court in Henry. However, the continued viability of that doctrine
126
following Quanta has been questioned. The relevance of Quanta’s
impact on Mallinckrodt’s conditional sale doctrine for the purposes of this
Article is as follows: A central question addressed in the Article is whether
a patent holder can rely on a breach of contract remedy to enforce a postsale restriction on a patented product. This question takes on special
significance if there is meaningful doubt as to whether the conditional
sale doctrine is good law. If a patent holder has the option of pursuing a
patent infringement remedy or a breach of contract remedy in the
context of a violation of a post-sale restriction by the buyer of a patented
product, it will almost certainly pursue the patent infringement remedy,
as was the case in both Mallinckrodt and Quanta. In the absence of a
patent infringement remedy, however, reliance on a breach of contract
claim becomes essential if the patent holder is to exercise some ability to
control its patented product following a sale. Accordingly, a
comprehensive analysis of the enforceability under contract law of postsale contractual restrictions, as provided in this Article, is justified.
1. Facts in Mallinckrodt and the Federal Circuit’s Holding
Mallinckrodt, Inc. (“Mallinckrodt”) owned a number of patents that
covered a medical device used for the delivery of radioactive or
therapeutic material in the form of an aerosol mist for the diagnosis or
127
treatment of diseases of the lung. It manufactured the devices and sold
them to hospitals with an attached notice and a package insert that
128
indicated that the device was for a single use only. Despite the notice,
certain hospitals shipped used devices to Medipart, Inc. (“Medipart”) for
“reconditioning,” whereupon Medipart cleaned the devices and returned
them to the hospitals for reuse, without testing for radioactive or

125. Id.
126. See Hungar, supra note 110, at 529–30 (“In the Quanta opinion, the Supreme Court did not
explicitly overrule or even cite Mallinckrodt, and accordingly, questions have arisen regarding the
continued vitality of that case and its Federal Circuit progeny, with various commentators vigorously
asserting both sides of the question. A careful examination of the manner in which the Quanta case
was litigated and decided, however, sheds considerable light on that question, and indicates that there
is no longer any room for continued adherence to the Mallinckrodt line of cases.”); LaFuze, supra note
51, at 317 (“In failing to mention the Mallinckrodt case and the conditional sale doctrine in the Quanta
opinion, the Supreme Court left the status of the conditional sale doctrine unclear. Several ways of
reconciling the opinion with the doctrine exist . . . . Ultimately, leaving the scope of the conditional
sale doctrine intact is the best way for courts to ‘promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and the useful
[a]rts.’” (alterations in original)).
127. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 701–02.
128. Id. at 702.

584

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:561

129

biological contamination. Mallinckrodt filed suit against Medipart,
alleging patent infringement and inducement to infringe for its role in
130
violating the post-sale restriction placed on the device. Medipart
argued that the authorized first sale of the devices by Mallinckrodt to the
hospitals exhausted Mallinckrodt’s patent infringement remedies, relying
on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Motion Picture Patents and “the
131
Bauer trilogy”—Bauer, Straus, and Boston Store. The issue for the
Federal Circuit was whether a conditioned authorized first sale of a
patented product triggers patent exhaustion.
A threshold question is why the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt
failed to find for the alleged infringer on the basis of the fact that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Motion Picture Patents had overruled its
prior holding in Henry that a conditioned authorized first sale did not
result in patent exhaustion. The answer to that question can be found in
the lack of precision that has characterized the Supreme Court’s patent
exhaustion jurisprudence. Four problems are of particular note. First, both
before and after its decision in Henry, the Court has used the words
“without condition” or “unconditional” to describe the type of authorized
132
first sale that triggers patent exhaustion. This was especially confusing
when the Court used these qualifying words in a case in which it had
concluded that an authorized first sale of a patented product had
rendered a restriction that the patent holder had attempted to place on a
buyer’s use or disposition of the product as a condition of the sale
unenforceable through a patent infringement remedy. For example, in
Motion Picture Patents, the case that overruled Henry, the Court held
that the sale under consideration was an authorized first sale that
exhausted the applicable patent and rendered the restriction placed on
133
the buyer with respect to the product unenforceable under patent law.
Nonetheless, in summarizing its prior holding in Bauer upon which it
relied, the Court in Motion Picture Patents stated that “the right to vend
is exhausted by a single, unconditional sale, the article sold being thereby
carried outside the monopoly of the patent law and rendered free of
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 704.
132. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917) (“[T]he
right to vend is exhausted by a single, unconditional sale, the article sold being thereby carried outside
the monopoly of the patent law and rendered free of every restriction which the vendor may attempt
to put upon it.”); Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 455 (1873) (“[The patented coffin lids under
consideration were] sold . . . without condition or restriction.”); Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
544, 547 (1872) (“[A] patentee, when he has himself constructed a machine and sold it without any
conditions, or authorized another to construct, sell, and deliver it . . . without any conditions, and the
consideration has been paid to him for the thing patented, the rule is well established that the patentee
must be understood to have parted to that extent with all his exclusive right, and that he ceases to have
any interest whatever in the patented machine so sold and delivered.”); see also Keeler v. Standard
Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 663 (1895) (quoting the above language from Mitchell).
133. Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 507, 515–16.
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every restriction which the vendor may attempt to put upon it.”
However, the sale under consideration in Bauer (as in Motion Picture
135
Patents) was conditioned. The Court’s use of such qualifying language
in Motion Picture Patents raised questions as to the meaning of the words
“without condition” or “unconditional” and whether it was still possible
for a patent holder to preserve its patent infringement remedies through
some type of conditioning of the sale of its patented product to a buyer.
Second, the Supreme Court’s reliance on multiple justifications for
patent exhaustion, as discussed in Part I.A, permitted a court to select
from the various rationales the one that most effectively supported the
court’s ruling in a case. With respect to the conditional sale doctrine,
reliance on the implied license rationale for patent exhaustion provided
courts with useful arguments in support of the doctrine. The view that
the sale of a patented product is accompanied by an implied license to use
or dispose of that product conflates the act of selling and the granting of a
license. A court that adopted this view could rely on the favorable
treatment by the courts of restrictions placed on a licensee in arguing that
a restriction in the context of a conditioned authorized first sale should be
enforceable under patent law. Moreover, the enforceability of such a
restriction through a patent infringement remedy was consistent with the
perspective that an express condition placed upon the buyer of a
patented product limited the scope of the implied license and the extent of
patent exhaustion. The Supreme Court in Henry relied on the reasoning
set forth in this paragraph in providing its only endorsement, albeit time136
limited, of the conditional sale doctrine.
Third, a review of the Supreme Court’s patent exhaustion
jurisprudence indicates that the Court has failed to emphasize the
important distinction between a restriction placed by a patent holder on
its manufacturing licensee and a post-sale restriction placed by a patent
holder on the buyer of its patented product. The former is relevant to a
determination as to whether there has been an authorized first sale. The
latter may be unenforceable through a patent infringement remedy as a
result of patent exhaustion. Understanding the difference between the
two types of restrictions is essential for an appreciation of the distinction
between a conditioned authorized first sale by a patent holder, such as
occurred in Henry, and an infringing sale by a manufacturing licensee,
such as the one under consideration in General Talking Pictures. In both
instances, the Court found that the sale did not result in patent
exhaustion and that the post-sale restriction was enforceable against the
buyer through a patent infringement remedy. However, only the sale in
General Talking Pictures was without the authorization of the patent

134. Id. at 516 (emphasis added).
135. See supra Part I.A.
136. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1912).
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holder. Moreover, the Court’s conclusion that a conditioned authorized
first sale avoids patent exhaustion was subsequently rejected in Motion
Picture Patents, while the Court’s position on the infringing sale in
General Talking Pictures has not changed. By failing to articulate the
critical difference between the two types of product sales, the Court
allowed for the perpetuation of the view that both types of sales should
be treated in the same way from a patent exhaustion perspective.
Finally, the Court has not always been clear in its exhaustion cases
as to whether the post-sale restriction under consideration was
unenforceable under patent law, irrespective of the nature of the
restriction or because it violated some other law or policy. It is
noteworthy in that regard that in many of the exhaustion cases listed in
Table 1, the post-sale restriction under review was considered a violation
137
of antitrust or patent misuse law. The uncertainty resulting from the
Court’s failure to clearly explain the role that the nature of the restriction
had in its finding of patent exhaustion generated confusion as to the
scope of the exhaustion doctrine.
Without referencing the Supreme Court’s decision in Henry and the
fact that it was overruled in Motion Picture Patents, the Federal Circuit in
Mallinckrodt relied on the above-described ambiguities resulting from
the Supreme Court’s patent exhaustion jurisprudence to conclude that
the conditional sale doctrine was alive and well. The Mallinckrodt court
cited prior Supreme Court case law for the proposition that patent
138
exhaustion was only triggered by an unconditional sale, and noted that
the “principle of exhaustion of the patent right did not turn a conditional
139
sale into an unconditional one.” In addition, the court in Mallinckrodt
endorsed the concept that the sale of a patented product carries with it a
license with respect to that product that is the basis for the implied
140
license rationale for patent exhaustion. In so doing, the Federal Circuit
rejected the statement of the district court in the case, which had ruled in
favor of patent exhaustion, that “policy considerations require that no
conditions be imposed on patented goods after their sale and that
Mallinckrodt’s restriction could not ‘convert[] what was in substance a
141
sale into a license.’”

137. As seen below in Table 1, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bauer, Straus, Motion Picture
Patents, Boston Store, Ethyl Gasoline, Univis, and Masonite involved either a tying or price-fixing
obligation that the Court ruled was unenforceable under federal patent law and, in some instances,
void.
138. The Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt cited Adams, Mitchell, and Keeler as “cases in which the
Court considered and affirmed the basic principles that unconditional sale of a patented device
exhausts the patentee’s right to control the purchaser’s use of the device.” Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706–07 (Fed. Cir. 1992). See supra note 132.
139. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 706.
140. Id. at 703.
141. Id. (alteration in original).

April 2013]

CONTRACT-BASED POST-SALE RESTRICTIONS

587

By viewing a sale as comparable to a license, the Mallinckrodt court
could rely on prior Supreme Court decisions in Bement and United States
142
v. General Electric Co. that approved the enforcement of a product143
related restriction in the context of a patent license agreement, despite
the fact that neither of these cases involved an authorized first sale or
addressed the enforceability of a restriction placed by a patent holder on
144
the buyer of its patented product. Consistent with the implied license
rationale, the Federal Circuit noted that a patent holder’s right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling its patented product can be
waived in whole, through an unconditional sale, or only in part, by
placing a product-related restriction on a buyer as a condition of the
145
sale. In the latter instance, the scope of the implied license that
accompanies the sale of the patented product is limited, as is the extent
of the exhaustion of the patent holder’s right to exclude others through
146
an action for patent infringement.
The Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt also rejected the lower court’s
argument that the Supreme Court’s ruling in General Talking Pictures—
which required an unauthorized sale by a manufacturing licensee for the
avoidance of patent exhaustion—supported the conclusion that the
authorized first sale by Mallinckrodt of its patented device to hospitals
147
eliminated patent infringement remedies. In fact, the Federal Circuit
142. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
143. See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 703 (“As in other areas of commerce, private parties may
contract as they choose, provided that no law is violated thereby: ‘[T]he rule is, with few exceptions,
that any conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to this kind of property,
imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the right to manufacture or use or sell the
[patented] article, will be upheld by the courts.’” (alterations in original)); id. at 704–05 (‘“As was said
in United States v. General Electric Co., the patentee may grant a license ‘upon any condition the
performance of which is reasonable within the reward which the patentee by the grant of the patent is
entitled to secure.’” (citation omitted)).
144. See supra notes 14, 48; infra note 161.
145. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 703 (“The enforceability [under the patent law] of restrictions on
the use of patented goods derives from the patent grant, which is in classical terms of property: the
right to exclude. This right to exclude may be waived in whole or in part.” (citation omitted)); id. at
708 (“‘Unless there is some definite provision in the sale to the contrary, it can properly be assumed
that as part of the bargain the sale of a device incorporating a patented composition (composed, as
here, of unpatented elements) authorizes the buyer to continue to use the device so long as the latter
can and does use the elements he purchased from the patentee or licensor.’” (quoting the Court of
Claims in General Electric, 572 F.2d at 784, as support for the Federal Circuit’s endorsement of the
conditional sale doctrine)).
146. This argument, based on the implied license rationale for patent exhaustion, mirrors the one
made by the Supreme Court in Henry. See supra Part I.A. Moreover, the Federal Circuit in B. Braun
Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, in restating its holding in Mallinckrodt, proffered the tailored
consideration rationale for patent exhaustion, also discussed in Part I.A as justification for the
preservation of patent exhaustion remedies in the context of a conditioned authorized first sale of a
patented product. According to this rationale, which complements the implied license rationale, “[the]
exhaustion doctrine . . . does not apply to an expressly conditional sale . . . . In such a transaction, it is
more reasonable to infer that the parties negotiated a price that reflects only the value of the ‘use’ rights
conferred by the patentee.” B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
147. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 705.

588

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:561

viewed the lower court’s reliance on a distinction between an infringing
sale by a manufacturing licensee and a conditioned authorized first sale in
determining whether exhaustion has occurred as formalistic line drawing.
In the words of the Federal Circuit,
[t]he district court interpreted [the holding in General Talking Pictures]
as requiring that since the hospitals purchased the [patented] device
from the patentee Mallinckrodt, not from a manufacturing licensee, no
restraint on the purchasers’ use of the device could be imposed under
the patent law. However, in General Talking Pictures the Court did not
hold that there must be an intervening manufacturing licensee before
the patent can be enforced against a purchaser with notice of the
restriction. The Court did not decide the situation where the patentee
was the manufacturer and the device reached a purchaser in ordinary
channels of trade.
The [patented] device was manufactured by the patentee; but the sale
to the hospitals was the first sale and was with notice of the restriction.
Medipart offers neither law, public policy, nor logic, for the proposition
that the enforceability of a restriction to a particular use is determined by
whether the purchaser acquired the device from a manufacturing
licensee or from a manufacturing patentee. We decline to make a
distinction for which there appears to be no foundation. Indeed,
Mallinckrodt has pointed out how easily such a criterion could be
circumvented. That the viability of a restriction should depend on how
the transaction is structured was denigrated as “formalistic line drawing”
in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., the Court explaining, in
overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., that the legality of
attempts by a manufacturer to regulate resale does not turn on whether
the reseller had purchased the merchandise or was merely acting as an
agent of the manufacturer. The Court having disapproved reliance on
formalistic distinctions of no economic consequence in antitrust analysis,
we discern no reason to preserve formalistic distinctions of no economic
148
consequence, simply because the goods are patented.

Adopting this position enabled the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt to
cite the Supreme Court’s decisions in Mitchell and General Talking
149
Pictures as support for the conditional sale doctrine, despite the fact that
in each of these cases the sale was made by a manufacturing licensee that
150
lacked the authority to make the sale.
Finally, the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt rejected the lower court’s
reliance on the Supreme Court’s holdings in Motion Picture Patents and
the Bauer trilogy for the proposition that, following an authorized first
sale, no post-sale restriction on a patented product is enforceable through

148. Id. (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 707 (“In Mitchell v. Hawley the accused infringer had purchased a patented machine
that was licensed for use only during the original term of the patent grant. After the patent term was
extended the defendant argued that by virtue of his purchase he had acquired title free of the license
condition. The Court disagreed, upholding the restriction.”); id. at 701 (“[I]f Mallinckrodt’s restriction
was a valid condition of the sale, then in accordance with General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western
Electric Co., it was not excluded from enforcement under the patent law.” (citation omitted)).
150. See supra note 14; infra Table 1.

April 2013]

CONTRACT-BASED POST-SALE RESTRICTIONS

589

151

a patent infringement remedy. In the view of the Federal Circuit, the
cases cited by the lower court only “established that price-fixing and tying
restrictions accompanying the sale of patented goods were per se illegal.
These cases did not hold—and it did not follow—that all restrictions
152
accompanying the sale of patented goods were deemed illegal.”
The Federal Circuit concluded its opinion in Mallinckrodt by stating
that the restriction placed by Mallinckrodt on the hospitals that purchased
its patented device was enforceable under patent law provided that it was
153
not a violation of any applicable law or policy consideration. In the
words of the Federal Circuit,
the district court erred in holding that the restriction on reuse was, as a
matter of law, unenforceable under the patent law. If the sale of
[Mallinckrodt’s patented device] was validly conditioned under the
applicable law such as the law governing sales and licenses, and if the
restriction on reuse was within the scope of the patent grant or otherwise
justified, then violation of the restriction may be remedied by action
154
for patent infringement.

2. Counterarguments and the Impact of the Quanta Decision
The Federal Circuit’s holding in Mallinckrodt in support of the
conditional sale doctrine is open to a number of counterarguments that do
not depend on the Supreme Court’s latest decision on patent exhaustion in
Quanta. First, the Court’s only decision that endorsed the conditional sale
doctrine (in Henry) was overruled seventy-five years prior to the
155
Mallinckrodt court’s resurrection of the doctrine. And the Federal
Circuit in Mallinckrodt relied on many of the same arguments that had
156
been made by the Supreme Court in its Henry decision. The Federal
Circuit conveniently neglected to mention the Henry decision in its
Mallinckrodt opinion. Instead, it chose to limit the scope of the Supreme
Court’s holdings in Motion Picture Patents, which had overruled Henry,

151. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 704 (“The district court’s holding that Mallinckrodt’s restriction to
single patient use was unenforceable was, as we have remarked, based on ‘policy’ considerations. The
district court relied on a group of cases wherein resale price-fixing of patented goods was held illegal
[citing Bauer, Straus, and Boston Store], and that barred patent enforced tie-ins [citing Motion Picture
Patents].”); id. at 706 (“The district court[] stat[ed] that it ‘refuse[s] to limit Bauer and Motion Picture
Patents to tying and price-fixing not only because their language suggests broader application, but
because there is a strong public interest in not stretching the patent laws to authorize restrictions on
the use of purchased goods.’” (final alteration in original)).
152. Id. at 704. Note that, as another example of the lack of precision in patent exhaustion
jurisprudence, the actual question at issue was not whether a post-sale restriction is illegal, but
whether it is unenforceable through a patent infringement remedy, based on the exhaustion of the
applicable patent as a result of an authorized first sale.
153. Id. at 709.
154. Id.
155. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917). See supra
note 50.
156. See supra Part I.A and the various references to the Supreme Court’s Henry decision
throughout supra Part I.C.
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and its companion cases (Bauer, Straus, and Boston Store) by arguing
that those cases did not reject every post-sale restriction on a patented
product, but only those that violated antitrust or patent misuse law, such
as price-fixing or tying obligations. However, as the district court in
Mallinckrodt correctly noted, in its refusal to limit the reach of those
cases to price-fixing and tying restrictions, the language in those cases
157
suggested a broader application of the doctrine of patent exhaustion.
While it is true that a number of the restrictions rejected in the Supreme
Court’s early exhaustion cases were considered problematic under a
theory of patent misuse or as an antitrust violation, the majority of the
arguments in support of patent exhaustion following the first authorized
sale did not rely on the objectionable nature of the restriction at issue.
Instead, the case was made that the authorized sale of the patented
product by or on behalf of the patent holder for consideration moved the
product outside of the scope of the statutorily defined patent monopoly
158
and rendered post-sale restrictions unenforceable under patent law.
Following the lead of the Supreme Court in Henry, the Federal
Circuit in Mallinckrodt placed considerable weight on the fact that a
number of the prior decisions by the Court in which an authorized first
sale was held to result in patent exhaustion involved unconditional sales
and that the words “without conditions” or “unconditional” frequently
qualified the Court’s explanation of the type of sale that triggered
159
exhaustion. As noted above, such language was used in the Court’s
decision in Motion Picture Patents in overruling Henry, despite the fact
that the sale in that case was in fact conditioned. While this seemingly
inappropriate use of the term “unconditional” may simply reflect a lack of
precision by the Court in its early patent exhaustion rulings, another
explanation has been suggested:
In Mitchell, the Court did allude to the notion of an unconditional sale,
observing that the patent right is exhausted when the patentee ‘has
himself constructed a machine and sold it without any conditions, or
authorized another to construct, sell, and deliver it . . . without any
conditions.’ But at that time, a ‘conditional’ sale would have been
understood as an agreement to sell where title would not convey until
performance of a condition precedent. See, e.g., Harkness v. Russell,
118 U.S. 663, 666 (1886) (describing a “conditional sale” as a “mere
agreement to sell upon a condition to be performed” in which title
does not pass until the condition precedent is performed).
That narrower understanding of “conditional” is consistent with this
Court’s other patent-exhaustion cases, which explain that the doctrine
is triggered “if a person legally acquires a title to” a patented item;
when a patented item is “lawfully made and sold” or “passes to the
hands of the purchaser”; or upon “the purchase of the article from one

157. See supra note 151.
158. See supra Part I.A.
159. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 706–07.
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authorized by the patentee to sell it” . . . . See Motion Picture Patents,
243 U.S. at 515–516 (describing as an “unconditional sale” a sale made
subject to restrictions on resale price). Thus, under this Court’s cases, if
a purchaser acquires title to an item embodying the patented invention
through a sale authorized by the patentee, the patent is exhausted—
regardless of the patentee’s purported imposition of an explicit
160
restriction on use or resale.

The above interpretation of the meaning of the word “unconditional”
undercuts the Federal Circuit’s argument in Mallinckrodt that an
authorized sale of a patented product in which title passes to the buyer, but
which is conditioned by placing a restriction on the buyer’s use or
disposition of the product, does not trigger patent exhaustion.
As discussed above, the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt merged the
concepts of sale and license in its adoption of the implied license rationale
for patent exhaustion. This allowed the court to rely on Supreme Court
cases that enforced a product-related license restriction in arguing in favor
of the conditional sale doctrine, despite the fact that these cases did not
address the enforceability under patent law of a restriction placed on the
161
buyer of a patented product as a condition of the sale. Moreover, the
Federal Circuit dismissed the district court’s interpretation of General
Talking Pictures as requiring, for the avoidance of patent exhaustion, an
unauthorized sale by an intervening manufacturing licensee who lacked
the authority from the patent holder to make a sale in disregard of a
162
restriction placed by the patent holder on the licensee. This enabled the
appellate court to ignore the fundamental distinction between a
conditioned authorized first sale (as occurred in Mallinckrodt) and an
infringing sale (as occurred in General Talking Pictures). This strategy
was the basis for the Federal Circuit’s noteworthy use of Supreme Court
precedent to rule in favor of the conditional sale doctrine in Mallinckrodt.
The Supreme Court cases relied on by the Federal Circuit in
Mallinckrodt (Mitchell, Bement, General Electric, and General Talking
Pictures) each involved an infringing sale by a manufacturing licensee as
163
opposed to a conditioned authorized first sale. The Supreme Court in
160. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 32, at 20–21
(alteration in original) (selected citations omitted).
161. In both Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902) (cited in Henry), and United States v.
General Electric, 272 U.S. 476 (1926) (decided after Henry), the Supreme Court held that the productrelated restriction under consideration placed by the patent holder on its manufacturing licensee was
enforceable against a licensee that had failed to honor the restriction in its sale of the patented product.
In neither case did the court consider any restriction placed by the patent holder on the buyer.
162. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 701.
163. Note that the Supreme Court ruled in favor of patent exhaustion where a first sale was made
by a manufacturing licensee that was authorized by the patent holder to make the sale. See Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Motion Picture Patents
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). In all of these cases, an authorized first sale was made
by a manufacturing licensee and in each case the Court concluded that the sale exhausted all patent
remedies and rendered the restriction associated with the sale unenforceable under federal patent law.
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Henry relied on the same strategy, citing Mitchell and Bement, in its
subsequently overruled holding that a conditioned authorized first sale
164
preserves patent infringement remedies. Recall that Justice Lurton, in
his opinion in Henry, had to look to his prior Sixth Circuit decision in
Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener for a ruling in which a conditioned
165
authorized first sale by a patent holder did not trigger patent exhaustion.
The Federal Circuit’s use of Supreme Court precedent in Mallinckrodt,
mirroring that of the Supreme Court in Henry, raises legitimate concerns
as to the soundness of its holding in support of the conditional sale
doctrine.
The above review of the Supreme Court’s patent exhaustion case law
that was available to, and relied on by, the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt
suggests that there were flaws in the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in that
case. The Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Quanta, if anything,
casts further doubt on the validity of the conditional sale doctrine as
articulated in Mallinckrodt. As discussed in Part I.B.1, the Supreme
Court in Quanta laid down a per se rule for patent exhaustion, that is,
that an authorized first sale of a product exhausts any patents covering or
substantially embodied in the product, and prevents the patent holder
from relying on patent law to control the post-sale use or disposition of
that product. No mention is made in the Quanta decision of an ability of
the patent holder to preserve its patent infringement remedies by placing
a post-sale restriction on its buyer as a condition of the sale.
The Supreme Court in Quanta deftly avoided any discussion of
Mallinckrodt, but did so in a way that was consistent with the difference in
the fact patterns in Quanta and in Mallinckrodt. Quanta involved a sale by
a manufacturing licensee (Intel). The Court’s focus in deciding the case
was whether or not the manufacturing licensee was granted the right by
the patent holder (LGE) to make the sale, despite the understanding by
the manufacturing licensee and by the buyer (Quanta) that the patent
holder did not intend for the products that substantially embodied its
patent rights (the Licensed Intel Products) to be used with products other
166
than those also produced by the manufacturing licensee. In deciding that
the sales made by the manufacturing licensee were authorized—that is,
that they were not infringing sales—the Court concluded that the sales by
the manufacturing licensee triggered patent exhaustion, thereby
extinguishing patent remedies and rendering any post-sale restrictions on
the products sold unenforceable under patent law. This conclusion
resolved the case in Quanta and allowed the Court to refrain from a
discussion of the conditioned authorized sale doctrine, in which the focus
None of these Supreme Court cases involved a fact pattern similar to the ones in Heaton-Peninsular
Button-Fastener, Henry, and Mallinckrodt. See supra Part I.A, note 14; infra Table 1.
164. See supra Part I.A.
165. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 38 (1911).
166. Quanta Computer, 553 U.S. at 638.
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of the analysis is not on whether the selling party has the authority to sell
the patented product, but on whether an authorized seller has a right to
rely on patent remedies to enforce post-sale restrictions on a buyer.
However, the fact that the Quanta Court did not deem it necessary to
address the question of whether Quanta was bound by any contractual
obligation to refrain from combining the Licensed Intel Products with
non-Intel components (for example, on the basis of the written notice
that Intel was required to provide to Quanta in connection with the sale)
is of relevance to an assessment of the viability of Mallinckrodt’s
conditional sale doctrine. It indicates that, from the Court’s perspective,
once it had been determined that Intel was authorized to sell the Licensed
Intel Products to Quanta, patent remedies were exhausted by the sale and
a post-sale restriction placed on Quanta could not preserve such remedies.
This interpretation supports a conclusion that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Quanta overruled Mallinckrodt.
Finally, the Quanta Court’s rejection of the implied license rationale
for patent exhaustion undermined one of the central arguments relied on
by the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt in its endorsement of the
conditional sale doctrine. It called into question the Federal Circuit’s
167
treatment of a sale as a license and its reliance on restricted patent

167. It is worth noting that in LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics, Inc., 453 F.3d 1364 (Fed.
Cir. 2006), the decision that was reversed by the Supreme Court in Quanta, the Federal Circuit had
argued that the license granted by LGE to Intel to manufacture and sell products that substantially
embodied the LGE patents was itself a sale for patent exhaustion purposes. Id. at 1370. This is the flip
side of a claim that a sale is a license. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Quanta offered no acceptance,
nor even a recognition, of this conclusion by the Federal Circuit in Bizcom. But see LG Elecs., Inc. v.
Hitachi, Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1047–48 (N.D. Cal. 2009). At first glance, the positions taken by
the Federal Circuit in Bizcom and the Supreme Court in Quanta regarding the issue of whether a
license is a sale for exhaustion purposes are the opposite of what would be expected if one accepts the
reasonable conclusion that, in recent years, the Federal Circuit has been more protective of a patent
holder’s rights than the Supreme Court has been. By viewing a license as the equivalent of a sale for
exhaustion purposes, the Federal Circuit has expanded the type of contractual relationships in which a
patent holder could lose its patent infringement remedies as a result of exhaustion. In contrast, the
Supreme Court’s failure to embrace the view that a license is the equivalent of a sale for exhaustion
purposes limits the potential impact of the patent exhaustion doctrine. On closer analysis, however,
the positions adopted by the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court are consistent with their apparent
biases as they relate to the rights of the patent holder. In downplaying the distinction between a
license and a sale, the Federal Circuit has provided support for its conditional sale doctrine (as
articulated in Mallinckrodt) that offers a patent holder an effective means of preserving its patent
infringement remedies. The reasoning is as follows: One interpretation of patent exhaustion is that in
providing a patented product to a party in exchange for consideration, a patent holder has granted to
that party an implied license under any patents embodied in the product. However, this implied
license can be limited by an express contractual restriction placed on the party that obtains the
product, thereby preserving the patent holder’s infringement remedies in the event that such party
fails to honor the restriction. In effect, the Federal Circuit has conflated the concepts of the granting of
a license and the making of a sale, and in so doing has bolstered its argument in support of the
conditioned sale doctrine by allowing for the avoidance of patent exhaustion through use of an express
contractual limitation of the implied license that accompanies the disposition of a product to a third
party for consideration. In contrast, the Supreme Court in Quanta rejected the implied license
rationale for patent exhaustion in favor of its reliance on an authorized first sale as the key to trigger
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license cases such as Bement and General Electric in concluding that
patent exhaustion can be avoided by conditioning an authorized first sale
to a buyer. Moreover, the Quanta Court’s rejection of the implied license
rationale also eliminated one of the more compelling arguments in favor
of the conditional sale doctrine, namely, that an express condition placed
upon the buyer of a patented product limited the scope of the implied
license that accompanied the sale of the product and preserved patent
infringement remedies.
Adopting the view that Quanta overruled Mallinckrodt and that the
conditional sale doctrine is no longer good law revives the Federal
Circuit’s admonition in Mallinckrodt that the law of patent exhaustion
should not be interpreted so as to constitute “formalistic line drawing” of
168
“no economic consequence.” In the absence of an ability to preserve
patent infringement remedies through conditioning an authorized first sale
to a buyer of a patented product, a patent holder who wished to impose
post-sale restrictions on its buyer that would be enforceable under patent
law would need to sell through an intervening manufacturing licensee. In
essence, the patent holder could “restrict the use of a product by sales
through a licensee in a manner that would not be permitted if the patent
169
[holder] sold the product directly.” Unlike the Federal Circuit in
Mallinckrodt, the Supreme Court in Quanta recognized the important
distinction between an infringing sale by a manufacturing licensee and a
conditioned authorized first sale. The former does not trigger patent
exhaustion while the latter does. A discussion of whether an important

patent exhaustion. While this approach limits the impact of the patent exhaustion doctrine to the sale
of (as opposed to the license of rights with respect to) a patented product, it undermines any limited
implied license argument that can be relied on to support Mallinckrodt’s conditional sale doctrine,
which preserves patent infringement remedies despite the authorized first sale of a patented product.
Note that the Federal Circuit in Bizcom relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942), in concluding that a license can be considered the equivalent of a
sale for patent exhaustion purposes. The Bizcom court cited the following passage from Masonite in
justifying its conclusion: “[T]his Court has quite consistently refused to allow the form into which the
parties chose to cast the transaction to govern. The test has been whether or not there has been such a
disposition of the article that it may fairly be said that the patentee has received his reward for the use
of the article.” Id. at 278. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to debate whether Masonite
provides adequate support for the conclusion reached by the Federal Circuit in Bizcom that a license
can constitute a sale for patent exhaustion purposes, the following distinction is noteworthy:
According to the Federal Circuit in Bizcom, the license granted by LGE to Intel to LGE’s entire
portfolio of computer-related patents constituted a sale for patent exhaustion purposes, despite the
fact that Intel was granted the right to manufacture products covered by such patents for future sale
and that the so-called “sale” by LGE did not involve the transfer of a physical object from LGE to
Intel. In contrast, the “sale” in Masonite that triggered exhaustion involved the transfer of a patented
product manufactured by the patentee to a network of del credere agents who sold the product on
behalf of the patentee, pursuant to the patentee’s pricing restrictions, without ever gaining title to the
product (an arrangement that, according to the Supreme Court, violated the Sherman Act, rendering
the pricing restrictions unenforceable).
168. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1992). See supra Parts I.B.2.b,
I.C.1.
169. See Holman, supra note 109, at *4.
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judge-made doctrine such as patent exhaustion should critically depend on
170
such a distinction is beyond the scope of this Article. What matters for
our purposes is that the weight of the evidence indicates that
Mallinckrodt’s conditional sale doctrine was rejected in Quanta, a view
171
172
adopted by a majority of commentators and at least one district court.

170. Thomas G. Hungar, who presented the oral argument before the Supreme Court on behalf of
the United States in Quanta, has provided the following response to claims that the Quanta decision
can lead to anomalous outcomes based on formalistic line drawing of little economic consequence:
Some commentators have criticized the rule that patent holders can limit their licensees’
right to sell and enforce that limitation by means of patent infringement suits, viewing
that result as anomalous in light of patent holders’ inability to restrict the post-sale rights
of purchasers. But that seeming anomaly is in fact no anomaly at all, when one
understands the principle underlying the patent-exhaustion doctrine. The doctrine is
based on the proposition that, by its very nature, exercise of the statutory right to sell a
patented article removes that article from the scope of the patent laws.
A mere license is not the sale of a patented article, and thus a mere licensee has no
basis on which to claim exhaustion; its rights are limited to the scope of the license.
Because exhaustion is triggered only by an authorized sale, licensee sales that are not
authorized by the license do not give rise to exhaustion but instead constitute patent
infringement. Finally, to the extent the charge of ‘anomaly’ rests on the assumption that
the Supreme Court’s patent-exhaustion doctrine permits patent holders to impose postsale restrictions through licensees that they could not impose directly, that underlying
assumption is incorrect. Patent holders are free to decide when and on what terms they
will sell their patented products and thus could enforce directly, by simple refusals to
sell, the same sorts of restrictions that they can require their licensees to follow on pain
of patent infringement. For example, as in General Talking Pictures, a patent holder
could authorize its licensee to sell only to certain types of customers, or alternatively the
patent holder could achieve the same result by selling its patented products directly and
choosing to limit the customers to whom it sells or the circumstances in which it will sell
to different classes of customers. The exhaustion doctrine operates the same way in
either instance: once an authorized sale occurs, whether by the patent holder or the
licensee, exhaustion follows. To be sure, the patent holder by definition cannot make an
unauthorized sale, absent extraordinary circumstances such as plainly ultra vires actions
by corporate employees, but it can exercise its patent right to refuse to make undesired
sales or alternatively can employ its patent right to prevent its licensees from making
such sales.
Hungar, supra note 110, at 537–38 n.108 (citations omitted).
171. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 502 (“In its 2008 Quanta decision the Supreme Court
unanimously rejected the Federal Circuit’s approach [in Mallinckrodt] and restored the first sale rule
to its original broad scope.”); Hungar, supra note 110, at 529–30 (“In the Quanta opinion, the Supreme
Court did not explicitly overrule or even cite Mallinckrodt, and accordingly, questions have arisen
regarding the continued vitality of that case and its Federal Circuit progeny, with various
commentators vigorously asserting both sides of the question. A careful examination of the manner in
which the Quanta case was litigated and decided, however, sheds considerable light on that question,
and indicates that there is no longer any room for continued adherence to the Mallinckrodt line of
cases.”); McDermott, supra note 109, at 76 (“The line of Federal Circuit precedents beginning with
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart Inc (Fed. Cir. 1992) is almost certainly not good law in light of the
analysis in Quanta.” (quoting John Duffy, Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law
School)); Holman, supra note 109, at *1 (“[I]t appears to me that Quanta implicitly overrules
Mallinckrodt . . . .”). But see LaFuze et al., supra note 51, at 317 (“In failing to mention the
Mallinckrodt case and the conditional sale doctrine in the Quanta opinion, the Supreme Court left the
status of the conditional sale doctrine unclear. Several ways of reconciling the opinion with the
doctrine exist. . . . Ultimately, leaving the scope of the conditional sale doctrine intact is the best way
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II. Enforceability of Contract-Based Post-Sale Restrictions
Through a Breach of Contract Remedy
In Part I, we argued that the Supreme Court in Quanta laid down a
per se rule for patent exhaustion, that is, that an authorized first sale of a
product exhausts any patents covering or substantially embodied in the
product, and prevents the patent holder from relying on patent law to
control the post-sale use or disposition of that product. The Court, in its
unanimous decision, provided no support for the conditional sale doctrine,
as articulated in Mallinckrodt, that permits a patent holder to preserve its
patent infringement remedies by placing a post-sale restriction on its buyer
as a condition of the sale. Based on a review of Supreme Court patent
exhaustion jurisprudence, including its recent decision in Quanta, we
concluded that Mallinckrodt has been overruled. Yet even if one allows
for the possibility that the conditional sale doctrine remains good law,
there is sufficient uncertainty regarding the status of the doctrine to
suggest that it would be ill-advised for a patent holder that intends to
control the post-sale use or disposition of its patented product to ignore
the possible use of contract-based post-sale restrictions regarding the
product. The issue then is whether such restrictions are enforceable
through a breach of contract remedy, even if patent infringement remedies
have been exhausted. The Quanta Court raised but did not resolve this
issue in the following footnote to its opinion:
We note that the authorized nature of the sale to Quanta does not
necessarily limit LGE’s other contract rights. LGE’s complaint does not
include a breach-of-contract claim, and we express no opinion on
whether contract damages might be available even though exhaustion
operates to eliminate patent damages. See Keeler v. Standard FoldingBed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 . . . (1895) (“Whether a patentee may protect
himself and his assignees by special contracts brought home to the
purchasers is not a question before us, and upon which we express no
for courts to ‘promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and the useful [a]rts.’”).
172. Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585 (E.D. Ky.
2009) (“After reviewing Quanta, Mallinckrodt, and the parties’ arguments, this Court is persuaded that
Quanta overruled Mallinckrodt sub silentio.”). It is noteworthy, however, that the Federal Circuit has
continued to cite Mallinckrodt and Braun with approval in its post-Quanta decisions, e.g., Princo Corp.
v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott
Laboratories, and Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., we explained the rationale underlying the
[patent misuse] doctrine. As a general matter, the unconditional sale of a patented device exhausts the
patentee’s right to control the purchaser’s use of the device thereafter, on the theory that the patentee
has bargained for, and received, the full value of the goods. That “exhaustion” doctrine does not
apply, however, to a conditional sale or license, where it is more reasonable to infer that a negotiated
price reflects only the value of the “use” rights conferred by the patentee.” (citations omitted));
Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 80 USLW 3380, 2012
WL 4748082 (2012) (“[In Monsanto Co. v. McFarling,] [t]his court held, based on Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.
Medipart, Inc., that the conditions in Monsanto’s Technology Agreement were valid and legal and did
not implicate the doctrine of patent exhaustion. In any event, the court stated, ‘[t]he “first sale”
doctrine of patent exhaustion . . . [wa]s not implicated, as the new seeds grown from the original batch
had never been sold. The price paid by the purchaser ‘reflects only the value of the ‘use’ rights
conferred by the patentee.’” (alterations in second sentence in original) (citations omitted)).
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opinion. It is, however, obvious that such a question would arise as a
question of contract, and 173
not as one under the inherent meaning and
effect of the patent laws”).

In this Part, we address this issue by considering the following
questions: Can a contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product
be enforced through a breach of contract remedy? Does the answer to the
first question depend on the nature of the post-sale restriction? And if only
some contract-based post-sale restrictions are enforceable, which ones?
We also consider the relative benefit to a patent holder of a breach of
contract remedy as compared to a patent infringement remedy.
A. Is ANY Contract-Based Post-Sale Restriction on a Patented
Product Enforceable Though a Breach of Contract Remedy?
A determination of whether any contract-based post-sale restriction
on a patented product can be enforced through a breach of contract
remedy under state law, irrespective of the nature of the restriction,
requires an assessment of whether such enforcement (i) constitutes an
impermissible attempt to contract around the doctrine of patent
exhaustion that is preempted under federal patent law, (ii) is contrary to
the related but later developed doctrine of patent misuse, or (iii) is a
violation of the public policies against restraints on alienation or
restraints of trade, which have also been linked to the exhaustion
174
doctrine. We consider each of these questions in this Part.
1. Is a Contract-Based Post-Sale Restriction on a Patented Product
an Impermissible Attempt to Contract-Around Patent Exhaustion?
The initial question is whether any post-sale restriction placed by a
patent holder on the buyer of its patented product is enforceable through a
breach of contract remedy under state law. And the first hurdle to
overcome in answering this question is to determine whether the inclusion
of any such restriction in a contract is a violation of any objective of federal
patent law that underlies the patent exhaustion doctrine, rendering the
provision void as a result of the preemptive effect of federal law on
conflicting state contract law. It is noteworthy that the Quanta Court’s
footnote concerning the potential use of a breach-of-contract remedy to
enforce a post-sale restriction cited the Court’s earlier statement in
175
Keeler regarding the issue. The Keeler quotation is of significance not
only as evidence of the Supreme Court’s prior failure to resolve this issue
but also as an expression of the Court’s position on the limit of the patent
exhaustion doctrine. Specifically, the quotation from Keeler included the
following language:

173. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 637 n.7 (2008).
174. See supra Part I.A.
175. Quanta, 533 U.S. at 637 n.7.
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Whether a patentee may protect himself and his assignees by special
contracts brought home to the purchasers is not a question before us,
and upon which we express no opinion. It is, however, obvious that
such a question would arise as a question of contract, 176
and not as one
under the inherent meaning and effect of the patent laws.

We interpret the emphasized language as setting a limit on the scope of
patent exhaustion (which is a doctrine that emanates from “the inherent
meaning and effect of the patent laws”), indicating that while patent
exhaustion eliminates patent infringement remedies in the context of the
breach of a post-sale restriction on a patented product, it does not work
to void every such restriction as an impermissible work-around of the
patent exhaustion doctrine.
While the Keeler statement is instructive, it was offered in a
nineteenth century patent exhaustion decision whose outcome was not
177
dependent on the accuracy of the statement. Accordingly, a more
comprehensive evaluation of the question of whether a contract-based
post-sale restriction on a patented product is an impermissible attempt to
contract around patent exhaustion is required. And such an evaluation
involves a determination of whether the enforcement of a post-sale
restriction on a patented product through a breach of contract remedy is
incompatible with any patent law objective that underlies patent
exhaustion. As discussed in Part I.A, the Court has provided a variety of
justifications for the exhaustion doctrine. However, the justification that
has been relied on most frequently, and is consistent with the Court’s
recent holding in Quanta, is that the authorized first sale of a patented
product, which provides the patent holder with compensation for the
relinquishment of its rights, moves the product outside of the limits of the
statutorily defined patent monopoly and renders post-sale restrictions
unenforceable under patent law. This justification for the doctrine of
patent exhaustion reflects an objective of federal patent law that had
already been articulated at the time of the Supreme Court’s development
178
of the judge-made doctrine of patent exhaustion.
179
The Supreme Court’s decision in Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.
provides a succinct description of the objectives of the federal patent
system:
First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it
promotes disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation and to
permit the public to practice the invention once the patent expires; third,
the stringent requirements for patent protection seek to assure that ideas
180
in the public domain remain there for the free use of the public.

176. Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895) (emphasis added).
177. Keeler was a patent infringement case that did not include a breach of contract claim.
178. See Donald Chisum, Chisum on Patents OV-2–OV-7 (2012).
179. 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
180. Id. at 262; see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974) (“The stated
objective of the Constitution in granting the power to Congress to legislate in the area of intellectual
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181

In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Stiffel Co. and Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
182
Craft Boats, Inc., the Supreme Court cited the additional goal of
183
promoting “national uniformity in the realm of intellectual property.”
Sears also focused on the careful balance introduced into the federal
patent system designed “to promote invention while at the same time
184
preserving free competition,” but this emphasis on free competition is
part of the broader objective of leaving ideas in the public domain
available for public use. And Bonito Boats discussed the need for a
“clear federal demarcation between public and private property” and the
importance of “resolving the constant tension between private right and
185
public access,” but this public/private issue is also part of the broader
objective of assuring that ideas in the public domain remain there for
public use.

property is to ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ The patent laws promote this
progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often
enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development. The productive effort thereby fostered will
have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture
into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens.
In return for the right of exclusion—this ‘reward for inventions,’—the patent laws impose upon the
inventor a requirement of disclosure. . . . [T]he patent laws require that the patent application shall
include a full and clear description of the invention and ‘of the manner and process of making and using
it’ so that any person skilled in the art may make and use the invention. When a patent is granted and
the information contained in it is circulated to the general public and those especially skilled in the
trade, such additions to the general store of knowledge are of such importance to the public weal that
the Federal Government is willing to pay the high price of 17 years of exclusive use for its disclosure,
which disclosure, it is assumed, will stimulate ideas and the eventual development of further significant
advances in the art. The Court has also articulated another policy of the patent law: that which is in the
public domain cannot be removed there from by action of the States.” (citations omitted)).
181. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
182. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
183. Id. at 162; see Sears, 376 U.S. at 231 n.7 (“The purpose of Congress to have national uniformity in
patent and copyright laws can be inferred from such statutes as that which vests exclusive jurisdiction to
hear patent and copyright cases in federal courts.”); infra notes 184, 185.
184. Sears, 376 U.S. at 230–31 (“[T]he patent system is one in which uniform federal standards are
carefully used to promote invention while at the same time preserving free competition.”).
185. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 162–63 (“The Florida scheme [under consideration in this case]
blurs this clear federal demarcation between public and private property. One of the fundamental
purposes behind the Patent and Copyright Clauses of the Constitution was to promote national
uniformity in the realm of intellectual property. Since the Patent Act of 1800, Congress has lodged
exclusive jurisdiction of actions ‘arising under’ the patent laws in the federal courts, thus allowing for
the development of a uniform body of law in resolving the constant tension between private right and
public access. Recently, Congress conferred exclusive jurisdiction of all patent appeals on the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in order to ‘provide nationwide uniformity in patent law.’ This
purpose is frustrated by the Florida scheme, which renders the status of the design and utilitarian
‘ideas’ embodied in the boat hulls it protects uncertain. Given the inherently ephemeral nature of
property in ideas, and the great power such property has to cause harm to the competitive policies
which underlay the federal patent laws, the demarcation of broad zones of public and private right is
‘the type of regulation that demands a uniform national rule.’ Absent such a federal rule, each State
could afford patent-like protection to particularly favored home industries, effectively insulating them
from competition from outside the State.” (citations omitted)).
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A core objective of federal patent law that is implicated in the Court’s
justification for patent exhaustion is that the patent system must ensure
that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the public
186
and “cannot be removed therefrom by action of the States.”
Consideration of this objective is relevant to an assessment of whether a
contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product is enforceable
under state contract law or whether such enforcement is prohibited as an
impermissible attempt to contract around patent exhaustion, a judgemade doctrine developed to further this objective. As the Court stated in
its Sears decision (in which it held that a state’s unfair competition law
was incompatible with federal patent law and therefore preempted),
[federal patent law], like other laws of the United States enacted
pursuant to constitutional authority, [is] the supreme law of the land.
When state law touches upon the area of these federal statutes, it is
‘familiar doctrine’ that the federal policy ‘may not be set at naught, or
its benefits denied’ by the state law. This is true, of course, even if the
state law is enacted in the exercise of otherwise undoubted state
187
power.
188

In English v. General Electric Co., the Court summarized the three
circumstances in which state law is preempted under the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution:
First, Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its enactments
pre-empt state law. . . .
Second, in the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is
pre-empted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress
intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively. Such an
intent may be inferred from a ‘scheme of federal regulation . . . so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it,’ or where an Act of Congress
‘touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws
on the same subject.’ . . .
Finally, state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts
with federal law. Thus, the Court has found pre-emption where it is
impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal
requirements, or where state law “stands as an obstacle to the

186. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974); see supra note 180. Note that in
Part II.B.2, infra, we discuss another objective of federal patent law implicated in the Supreme Court’s
justification for patent exhaustion, that is, that the patent system should provide sufficient incentive to
inventors (but no more) to promote invention for the public good, where such incentive is in the form
of a one-time payment made at the time of the authorized first sale of a patented product (the single
reward interpretation discussed in Part I.A). This objective is relevant to an analysis of the
enforceability of a specific type of contract-based restriction that requires that the buyer of a patented
product make ongoing post-sale payments for the recurring use of the product—a so-called double
royalty obligation; see also infra note 331 for a discussion of a variation of the argument against double
royalties that is relevant to an analysis of the enforceability of any contract-based post-sale restriction.
187. Sears, 376 U.S. at 229 (citations omitted).
188. 496 U.S. 72 , 78 (1990).
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accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
189
Congress.”
190

Federal patent law does not provide for explicit preemption. Nor is field
preemption applicable to an assessment of whether an objective of federal
patent law that underlies patent exhaustion preempts the enforcement of a
contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product under state
191
contract law. As the Supreme Court stated in Aronson, in which the
Court considered the enforceability under state law of a royalty payment
obligation in a license agreement involving intellectual property,
“[c]ommercial agreements traditionally are the domain of state law. State
law is not displaced merely because the contract relates to intellectual
property which may or may not be patentable; the states are free to
regulate the use of such intellectual property in any manner not
192
inconsistent with federal law.”
The issue under consideration in this Part can be addressed,
however, through a conflict preemption analysis. While it is difficult to
make a case that an effort by a private party to enforce a contract-based
post-sale restriction on a patented product under state law makes it
impossible for that party to comply with both state and federal
requirements, such an effort may stand “as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of”
193
federal patent law. The Supreme Court in Aronson relied on this form of
194
conflict preemption, which has been labeled interference preemption, in
its assessment of whether federal patent law preempted the enforcement

189. Id. at 78–79 (alterations within internal quotations in original) (citations omitted).
190. See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(“[F]ederal patent law plainly does not provide for explicit preemption . . . .”).
191. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil, Inc., 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
192. Id. at 262 (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974)); see Cover v.
Hydramatic Packing Co., 83 F.3d 1390, 1393 (1996) (“With respect to field pre-emption, Title 35
occupies the field of patent law, not commercial law between buyers and sellers.”); Bonito Boats, Inc.
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 154 (1989) (“The pre-emptive sweep of our decisions in
Sears and Compco has been the subject of heated scholarly and judicial debate. Read at their highest
level of generality, the two decisions could be taken to stand for the proposition that the States are
completely disabled from offering any form of protection to articles or processes that fall within the
broad scope of patentable subject matter. . . . That the extrapolation of such a broad pre-emptive
principle from Sears is inappropriate is clear from the balance struck in Sears itself. . . . [W]hile Sears
speaks in absolutist terms, its conclusion that the States may place some conditions on the use of trade
dress indicates an implicit recognition that all state regulation of potentially patentable but unpatented
subject matter is not ipso facto pre-empted by the federal patent laws. What was implicit in our
decision in Sears, we have made explicit in our subsequent decisions concerning the scope of federal
pre-emption of state regulation of the subject matter of patent [citing Kewanee and Aronson].”
(citations omitted) (paragraphing omitted)).
193. Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262.
194. See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67 Md. L. Rev. 616, 622 n.29
(2008) (“‘[I]nterference preemption’ occurs where state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”).
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of a contract-based royalty payment obligation through a breach of
195
contract remedy.
The Supreme Court has identified two presumptions that guide an
196
interference preemption analysis. The first is that such an analysis is
based on the Court’s “oft-repeated comment . . . that ‘[t]he purpose of
Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case. As a
result, any understanding of the scope of a pre-emption statute must rest
197
primarily on ‘a fair understanding of congressional purpose.’” For our
analysis, the “congressional purpose” to consider is expressed in the
above-mentioned patent law objective that underlies the patent exhaustion
doctrine, namely, that ideas in the public domain should remain available
for free use of the public and cannot be removed by action of the states.
The second presumption identified by the Court is that “because the
States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long
presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of
action. In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which
Congress has ‘legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied,’ we ‘start with the assumption that the historic police powers of
the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was
198
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” This presumption against
preemption requires that in assessing whether the enforcement of any
contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product would
interfere with a core objective of federal patent law in a way that requires
preemption, we must consider not only the objective that is purportedly
interfered with but also the extent of the interference that would result
from such enforcement under state contract law. In the Supreme Court’s
seminal patent law preemption decisions in which conflict preemption by
199
federal patent law invalidated state law, the Court has made it clear
that something more than mere interference is required for preemption,
e.g., the enforcement of the state law under consideration would be too
200
201
great an encroachment on or a significant frustration of, or would

195. Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262 (“In this as in other fields, the question of whether federal law preempts state law ‘involves a consideration of whether that law ‘stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”).
196. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485–86 (1996).
197. Id. (citations omitted). This comment was initially made in Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn,
375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
198. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
199. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,
395 U.S. 653 (1969); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
200. See Sears, 376 U.S. at 232 (“States could allow perpetual protection to articles too lacking in
novelty to merit any patent at all under federal constitutional standards. This would be too great an
encroachment on the federal patent system to be tolerated.” (emphasis added)).
201. See Lear, 395 U.S. at 673 (“The parties’ contract, however, is no more controlling on this issue
than is the State’s doctrine of estoppel, which is also rooted in contract principles. The decisive
question is whether overriding federal policies would be significantly frustrated if licensees could be
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202

result in substantial interference with, federal patent law. Accordingly,
an interference preemption analysis does not lend itself to absolute,
bright-line pronouncements, but must be argued in terms of “degrees of
interference” and the identification of a potentially arbitrary line that
must be crossed to justify preemption.
The very purpose of a contract-based post-sale restriction on a
patented product is to enable the patent holder to maintain some measure
of control of the downstream use or disposition of the product, despite the
fact that the authorized first sale of the product places it outside of the
limits of any relevant patent. If the enforcement of any such restriction
through a breach of contract remedy under state law constitutes too great
an encroachment on, or a significant frustration of, or would result in
substantial interference with the patent law objective (reflected in the
doctrine of patent exhaustion) of ensuring that ideas in the public domain
remain there, then such enforcement must be preempted by federal law.
If, on the other hand, exhaustion of the patent remedy is enough to meet
this objective of the patent system, and enforcement of the breach of
contract remedy under state law does not meet the requisite degree of
interference to justify preemption, then such enforcement should be
203
permitted. In Bonito Boats, the Supreme Court’s most recent discussion
of federal patent law preemption, the Court provided an analytical
approach to addressing the above issue regarding the enforcement of
contract-based post-sale restrictions on patented products. The question
before the Court in Bonito Boats was whether a Florida statute prohibiting
“the use of a direct molding process to duplicate unpatented boat hulls”
and “the knowing sale of hulls so duplicated” conflicts with “strong federal
policy favoring free competition in ideas not meriting patent protection”
204
and thus is preempted by the Supremacy Clause. Relying on its prior
205
206
decisions in Sears and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., the
Court in Bonito Boats concluded that the Florida statute was preempted
by the Supremacy Clause because a state cannot offer patent-like
207
protection to intellectual creations that are in the public domain.

required to continue to pay royalties during the time they are challenging patent validity in the courts.
It seems to us that such a requirement would be inconsistent with the aims of federal patent policy.”
(emphasis added) (paragraphing omitted)).
202. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156–57 (“A state law that substantially interferes with the
enjoyment of an unpatented utilitarian or design conception which has been freely disclosed by its
author to the public at large impermissibly contravenes the ultimate goal of public disclosure and use
which is the centerpiece of federal patent policy.” (emphasis added)).
203. 489 U.S. at 141.
204. Id. at 141–42.
205. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
206. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
207. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156 (“[T]he States may not offer patent-like protection to
intellectual creations which would otherwise remain unprotected as a matter of federal law.”).
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Applying the rule of Bonito Boats to the question of whether a
contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product is enforceable
under state law requires a determination of the meaning of the terms
“patent-like protection” and “in the public domain.” In Bonito Boats, as
208
209
in Sears and in Compco, a state law that enjoined the copying of an
article that was clearly in the public domain was held to provide “patentlike protection” and was, accordingly, preempted as inconsistent with an
210
objective of federal patent law. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
another of the Supreme Court’s seminal patent law preemption cases,
the Court refused to preempt a state law trade secret action to enjoin the
disclosure or use of company trade secrets by former employees. The
Kewanee Court based its holding on its dual conclusion that (1) “[t]rade
secret law provides far weaker protection in many respects than the
211
patent law,” that is, does not provide “patent-like protection,” and
(2) “[t]he subject of a trade secret must be secret, and must not be of
212
public knowledge or of a general knowledge in the trade or business,”
213
i.e., is not “in the public domain.” Finally, in Aronson, the Court held
that a licensee’s contractual obligation to continue to pay royalties to the
inventor of a novel design for the rights to manufacture and sell a
product incorporating the design was enforceable under state law,
despite the fact that no patent covering the design was ever issued and
that the first sale of the product by the licensee placed the previously
confidential design in the public domain.
In concluding that enforcement of the royalty provision under state
contract law was not preempted by federal patent law, the Court ruled
that a contractual royalty payment obligation placed on a licensee for the
right to exploit a product design that was clearly in the public domain
was not the equivalent of “patent-like protection,” as that term is applied
in a preemption analysis. In essence, the Court held that, despite the fact
that the inventive design had entered the public domain and was free for
unfettered use by any party other than the licensee, the ongoing burden

208. Sears, 376 U.S. at 232–33 (“[B]ecause of the federal patent laws a State may not, when the
article is unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article itself or award damages for
such copying [under the State’s unfair competition law].”).
209. Compco, 376 U.S. at 234 (“[T]he use of a state unfair competition law to give relief against
copying of an unpatented industrial design [in the form of an injunction and damages] conflicts with
the federal patent laws.”).
210. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
211. Id. at 489–90 (“Trade secret law provides far weaker protection in many respects than the
patent law. While trade secret law does not forbid the discovery of the trade secret by fair and honest
means, e.g., independent creation or reverse engineering, patent law operates ‘against the world,’
forbidding any use of the invention for whatever purpose for a significant length of time. The holder of
a trade secret also takes a substantial risk that the secret will be passed on to his competitors, by theft
or by breach of a confidential relationship, in a manner not easily susceptible of discovery or proof.
Where patent law acts as a barrier, trade secret law functions relatively as a sieve.” (citation omitted)).
212. Id. at 475.
213. 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
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placed on the licensee in exchange for the rights to make and sell a
product based on the design was justified by the benefit provided the
214
licensee in being “the first to introduce a new product to the market.”
For our purposes, the Court ruled that, under the circumstances in
Aronson, a less than “patent-like” control exerted by the inventor, that is,
a royalty burden on the sale by a licensee of a product in the public
domain, was not preempted under federal patent law and was enforceable
under state contract law.
Contract-based, post-sale restrictions on patented products can vary
in their form and effect, e.g., a restriction on the use or disposition of the
product or a royalty payment obligation attached to the use or resale of
the product. It is arguable as to whether each and every such restriction
provides the patent holder with “patent-like protection” with respect to
its product following an authorized first sale (although the Court’s
holding in Aronson would indicate that a royalty payment obligation is
not the equivalent of such protection). However, the following points
suggest that not all such restrictions are unenforceable through a breach
of contract remedy as a result of preemption under the standard set forth
in Bonito Boats. First, the remedy under state contract law for a buyer’s
breach of any such post-sale restriction would typically be monetary
damages and not injunctive relief, raising the reasonable question of
whether the state (through a breach of contract remedy) is, in fact,
providing “patent-like protection” to a patent holder who authorizes the
sale of the patented product but subjects the buyer to a contract-based,
post-sale restriction. The distinction between monetary damages and
injunctive relief in assessing whether “patent-like protection” is being
provided by enforcement of a breach of contract remedy under state law
is highlighted in the following excerpt from Justice Douglas’ dissent in
Kewanee Oil. Arguing against the approval of injunctive relief under a
state’s trade secret law, Justice Douglas noted the following:
A suit to redress theft of a trade secret is grounded in tort damages for
breach of a contract—a historic remedy. Damages for breach of a
confidential relation are not pre-empted by this patent law, but an
injunction against use is pre-empted because the patent law states the
only monopoly over trade secrets that is enforceable by specific
performance; and that monopoly exacts as a price full disclosure. A
trade secret can be protected only by being kept secret. Damages for
breach of a contract are one thing; an injunction barring disclosure
does service for the protection accorded valid patents and is therefore
215
pre-empted.

While the Supreme Court’s recent decision in eBay, Inc. v.
216
MercExchange, L.L.C. (in which the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s

214. Id. at 263.
215. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 498–99 (citation omitted).
216. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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“general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent
217
in favor of the
infringement absent exceptional circumstances”
traditional four-factor test for injunctive relief) minimizes this distinction,
it is certainly the case that the Court considered the availability of
injunctive relief as a central element in the meaning of the term “patent218
like protection” in its seminal patent law preemption decisions.
Second, it is questionable that a patented product that is the subject
of a contract-based post-sale restriction truly enters the public domain
upon authorized first sale, where a valid, unexpired patent covering the
product is exhausted only with respect to the purchased product and
where the buyer is the only party that is contractually bound to adhere to
the agreed-to restrictions that are a condition of the sale. In other words,
there is a reasonable argument to be made that patent exhaustion in that
context is sufficiently distinct from patent expiration/invalidation to
justify a different treatment when it comes to determining what is “in the
public domain” for unfettered use by the public. The definition of public
domain has varied in the Supreme Court’s patent law preemption
jurisprudence from Sears through Kewanee Oil to Bonito Boats, ranging
from ideas not patented to ideas that are generally available to the
219
public. The Court, however, has never concluded that an idea embodied

217. Id. at 391 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
vacated, 547 U.S. 388 (2006)).
218. Each of the Supreme Court’s seminal patent law preemption decisions preceded its decision
in eBay and were issued during the period when injunctive relief was the remedy for patent
infringement in the absence of exceptional circumstances. See Part II.B.3.
219. See S. Stephen Hilmy, Bonito Boats’ Resurrection of the Preemption Controversy: The Patent
Leverage Charade and the Lanham Act “End Around,” 69 Tex. L. Rev. 729, 746–49 (1991) ). (“[A] key
interpretive move made in the Bonito Boats opinion concerns the notion of public domain. . . . [T]he
Bonito Boats Court stressed that ‘because the public awareness of a trade secret is by definition
limited, . . . “the policy that matter once in the public domain must remain in the public domain is not
incompatible with the existence of trade secret protection.”’ However, the Court here has simply
adopted, but not reconciled, the shift of meaning that the Kewanee and Aronson opinions used to
circumvent the Sears-Compco strong free competition policy rationale. This shift of meaning involves
a confusion of a trade secret notion of public domain and a patent law notion of public domain: a
confusion of publicity or nonsecrecy with the status of being unpatented or unpatentable.
The Court’s suggestion that ‘public awareness of a trade secret is by definition limited’ and
therefore trade secrets are not in the public domain, rests on a trade secrets notion of public
domain. . . .
. . . . The argument adopted by Bonito Boats is that since the patent law free competition
rationale rests on a policy of ‘favoring the full and free use of ideas in the public domain,’ and trade
secrets are by definition not in the public domain, then there is no clash between trade secret law and
the Sears-Compco patent preemption rationale.
The concept of public domain at work in the Sears-Compco rationale for patent law preemption,
however, is not defined in terms of substantial secrecy, but rather in terms of whether an article is
patented or is capable of being patented. Sears-Compco uses public domain in a patent law sense to
designate generally the domain of articles that are unprotected by federal patent law. . . .
An article can be unprotected by a patent for any number of reasons: (1) the article can fail to
meet the usefulness, novelty, and non-obviousness requirements for patentability under the patent
laws, (2) the article may have been granted patent protection but subsequently lost that protection
either through expiry of the term of the patent or invalidation . . . or (3) the owner of the article may
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in a patented product that has been sold with the authority of the patent
holder has entered the public domain.
In the end, one is left with a question of whether state law
enforcement of a contract-based, post-sale restriction on a patented
product, while not truly “patent-like protection,” is “too great an
220
encroachment on the federal patent system to be tolerated,” where the
restriction is placed on a product that is not clearly “in the public domain,”
as that term has been used, with some variability, by the Supreme Court in
its patent law preemption analyses. Application of the preemption
standard provided by the Supreme Court in its Bonito Boats decision
suggests that not every contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented
product is unenforceable through a breach of contract remedy under
state law, but it does not resolve the issue.
Accordingly, another approach to patent law preemption, relied on
221
by the Supreme Court in its decision in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, is worthy of
consideration in addressing the enforceability of post-sale restrictions. The
Court’s opinion in Lear does not read as a classic federal law preemption
analysis (in fact, the word “preemption” is not used in the text of the
opinion), but it clearly relied on the Supremacy Clause and a conflict with
federal patent law to reject the state common law doctrine of licensee
estoppel and to void a contract-based royalty payment obligation. In
Lear, the Court considered whether the doctrine of licensee estoppel,
which barred a patent licensee from challenging the validity of a licensed
patent, and an express contract provision that obligated the licensee to
continue to pay royalties until the licensed patent had been invalidated,
222
impermissibly interfered with an objective of federal patent law.
Citing its prior decisions in Sears and in Compco, the Lear Court
identified the relevant objective as the requirement under federal law
that “all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common good

simply choose not to seek patent protection.
However, what is left in the public domain in the Sears-Compco patent law sense may not be in
the public domain in the trade secret law sense. . . . [P]atent law may leave in the public domain
something which nevertheless satisfies the relative secrecy standards requisite for state trade secret
protection. Furthermore, given that Sears-Compco tended to equate public domain with anything that
is unprotected by federal patent, mere failure to seek patent protection leaves something in the public
domain for Sears-Compco patent law purposes, and thus there is an even greater overlap (and clash)
of the nonpublic domain of trade secrets and the Sears-Compco public domain of patent law.
It was on the basis of the broader Sears-Compco patent law sense of public domain, not a trade
secret conception of public domain, that Justices Black, Warren, Douglas, Brennan, Blackmun, and
Marshall dissented to attempts to modify the course set by Sears-Compco. It was the blurring of these
two incongruous senses of public domain that allowed the Burger Court to circumvent the SearsCompco free competition preemption rationale. Sears-Compco can be reconciled with Kewanee and
Aronson only by blurring (as the Bonito Boats opinion does) these two incongruous senses of public
domain.” (alterations within internal quotations in original) (footnotes omitted)).
220. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964).
221. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
222. Id. at 656, 673.
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223

unless they are protected by a valid patent.” The specific issue in Lear
was whether the state, by preventing or discouraging the timely
elimination of wrongly issued patents, was providing “patent-like
224
protection” to ideas that should be freely available for public use. In
deciding the issue, the Lear Court engaged in a balancing test that pitted
federal patent law against state contract law. Despite its acknowledgment
that “the law of contracts forbids a purchaser to repudiate his promises
simply because he later becomes dissatisfied with the bargain he has
225
made,” the Court rejected, as incompatible with federal patent law, the
doctrine of licensee estoppel, “which is . . . rooted in contract
226
principles.” and the licensee’s contractual obligation to continue to
make royalty payments during its challenge of the validity of the patent
at issue. Regarding licensee estoppel, the Court concluded that
the equities of the licensor do not weigh very heavily when they are
balanced against the important public interest in permitting full and
free competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the
public domain. Licensees may often be the only individuals with
enough economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an
inventor’s discovery. If they are muzzled, the public may continually be
required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or
justification. We think it plain that the technical requirements of
contract doctrine must give way before the demands of the public
interest in the typical situation involving the negotiation of a license
227
after a patent has issued.

In voiding the contract-based royalty payment obligation, the Court
stated that
[t]he parties’ contract . . . is no more controlling on this issue than is the
State’s doctrine of estoppel . . . . The decisive question is whether
overriding federal policies would be significantly frustrated if licensees
could be required to continue to pay royalties during the time they are
challenging patent validity in the courts.
It seems to us that such a requirement would be inconsistent with
the aims of federal patent policy. Enforcing this contractual provision
would give the licensor an additional economic incentive to devise
every conceivable dilatory tactic in an effort to postpone the day of
final judicial reckoning. We can perceive no reason to encourage
dilatory court tactics in this way. Moreover, the cost of prosecuting
slow-moving trial proceedings and defending an inevitable appeal
might well deter many licensees from attempting to prove patent
invalidity in the courts. The deterrent effect would be particularly
severe in the many scientific fields in which invention is proceeding at a
rapid rate. In these areas, a patent may well become obsolete long
before its 17-year term has expired. If a licensee has reason to believe
that he will replace a patented idea with a new one in the near future,
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 668.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 673.
Id. at 670–71.
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he will have little incentive to initiate lengthy court proceedings, unless
he is freed from liability at least from the time he refuses to pay the
contractual royalties. Lastly, enforcing this contractual provision would
undermine the strong federal policy favoring the full and free use of
ideas in the public domain. For all these reasons, we hold that Lear
must be permitted to avoid the payment of all royalties accruing after
228
Adkins’ 1960 patent issued if Lear can prove patent invalidity.

The Lear decision was followed by a series of federal district and
appellate court decisions that considered the enforceability under state
229
law of contract-based disincentives to patent validity challenges. The
approach to patent law preemption that emerged from Lear and the
cases that followed is applicable to our analysis of the enforceability of
contract-based, post-sale restrictions on patented products, and consists
of the following three steps: First, identify the patent law objective being
threatened by the contract restriction under consideration. In Lear, as in
our analysis, the objective is the need for ideas in the public domain to
remain there and not be removed by an action of a state. Second,
determine the degree of interference with the objective. This step was of
particular importance in Lear, where the Court acknowledged the
significance of enforcing contract terms agreed to by private parties. In the
balancing test performed in Lear, the Court voided a contract provision
only where it “significantly frustrated” an overriding federal policy and left
230
a licensee with “little incentive” to challenge a licensed patent. As one
commentator noted, the “Lear decision was based upon a policy of
‘eliminating obstacles to suit by those disposed to challenge the validity
of a patent,’ but the ‘spirit of Lear’ cannot logically demand that any and
all rules of contract law . . . be ignored to give licensees every possible
231
incentive to challenge patent validity.”
Third, and finally, determine whether policy considerations, other
than those involved in a weighing of an objective of federal patent law
against a requirement of state contract law, come into play in assessing a
contract-based restriction. Such considerations may shift the balance in
favor of enforcing the restriction under state law. For example, despite
the Lear Court’s rejection of licensee estoppel in the context of a typical
patent license agreement, the Federal Circuit subsequently held that
contract-based restrictions on patent validity challenges were
enforceable under state law where they were necessary to avoid
232
“unfairness and injustice” (as in the case of assignor estoppel), or were

228. Id. at 673–74.
229. See Alfred C. Server & Peter Singleton, Licensee Patent Validity Challenges Following
MedImmune: Implications for Patent Licensing, 3 Hastings Sci. & Tech. L.J. 243, 333–97 (2011).
230. Lear, 395 U.S. at 673–74.
231. J. Thomas McCarthy, “Unmuzzling” the Patent Licensee: Chaos in the Wake of Lear v. Adkins
(Part II—Conclusion), 59 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 544, 568 (1977) (footnote omitted).
232. See Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1224–25 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[I]t is
the implicit representation by the assignor that the patent rights that he is assigning (presumably for
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justified in light of the strong public interest in the settlement of patent
litigation (as in the case of a no-challenge clause included in a settlement
233
234
agreement). As noted by the Federal Circuit, these additional policy
considerations were not included in the Lear balancing test and allowed
for a preemption analysis outcome that differed from the one reached by
the Supreme Court in Lear. What is important for our purposes is that
the Lear approach to preemption analysis is based on a case-by-case
review of the contract restriction under consideration. This approach is
consistent with a conclusion that Supreme Court patent law preemption
jurisprudence does not dictate that every attempt to enforce a contractbased post-sale restriction on a patented product must be preempted as an
impermissible work around of a core patent law objective reflected in the
doctrine of patent exhaustion.
It is noteworthy that our conclusion that at least some contract-based
post-sale restrictions on patented products will survive a preemption
challenge and be enforceable under state law is consistent with the
legislative history of the federal copyright statute’s first sale doctrine.
Section 109(a) of the federal copyright statute reads, in part, as follows:
“[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under
this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
235
possession of that copy or phonorecord.” However, the legislative
history regarding the adoption of the first sale doctrine under federal
copyright law included the following statement:
[T]he outright sale of an authorized copy of a book frees it from any
copyright control over its resale price or other conditions of its future
value) are not worthless that sets the assignor apart from the rest of the world and can deprive him of
the ability to challenge later the validity of the patent. To allow the assignor to make that
representation at the time of the assignment (to his advantage) and later to repudiate it (again to his
advantage) could work an injustice against the assignee.”); id. at 1225 (“[W]e believe that the primary
consideration in now applying the doctrine [of assignor estoppel] is the measure of unfairness and
injustice that would be suffered by the assignee if the assignor were allowed to raise defenses of patent
invalidity. Our analysis must be concerned mainly with the balance of equities between the parties.”).
233. See Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[W]hile the federal
patent laws favor full and free competition in the use of ideas in the public domain over the technical
requirements of contract doctrine, settlement of litigation is more strongly favored by the law.”); see
also Diversey Lever, Inc. v. Ecolab, Inc., 191 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947
F.2d 469 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
234. See Diamond Scientific, 848 F.2d at 1224–25 (“Our holding is that this is a case in which public
policy calls for the application of assignor estoppel. We are, of course, not unmindful of the general
public policy disfavoring the repression of competition by the enforcement of worthless patents. Yet
despite the public policy encouraging people to challenge potentially invalid patents, there are still
circumstances in which the equities of the contractual relationships between the parties should deprive
one party (as well as others in privity with it) of the right to bring that challenge.”); see also Flex-Foot,
238 F.3d at 1369 (“Clearly, the importance of res judicata and its hierarchical position in the realm of
public policy was not a relevant consideration in Lear and therefore the Supreme Court never
evaluated the importance of res judicata and whether it trumps the patent laws’ prescription of full and
free competition in the use of ideas that are in reality a part of the public domain.”).
235. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (a) (2012).
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disposition. . . . . This does not mean that conditions on future
disposition of copies or phonorecords, imposed by a contract between
their buyer and seller, would be unenforceable between the parties as a
breach of contract, but it does mean that they could not be enforced by
236
an action for infringement of copyright.

The clear meaning of the above statement is that, with respect to the
federal copyright laws, an authorized first sale of a copyrighted item will
eliminate infringement remedies, but not necessarily contract remedies
under state law, which are not preempted by the federal copyright
statute. This conclusion is all the more significant in light of the stated
position of the Supreme Court that the same rules of interpretation and
237
application apply to both the copyright statute and the patent statute.
2.

Is a Contract-Based Post-Sale Restriction on a Patented
Product Per Se Patent Misuse?

Another argument against the enforceability of any contract-based
post-sale restriction on a patented product through a breach of contract
remedy, irrespective of the nature of the restriction, is that the inclusion
of such a restriction in a contract constitutes per se patent misuse. Patent
238
misuse is an affirmative defense to a claim of patent infringement.
Misuse will be found if a patent is used in an effort to impermissibly
broaden the physical or temporal scope of the patent monopoly or in
239
violation of antitrust law. Where a patent has been misused in
negotiating a license or sale agreement, the offending contractual
provision is invalid and the misused patent is unenforceable, even against
third party infringers, until the misuse terminates and its consequences
240
are fully dissipated.
241
Like patent exhaustion, patent misuse is a judge-made doctrine.
Also like patent exhaustion, patent misuse focuses on the scope of the

236. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 79 (1976).
237. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 579 n.3 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“It bears
noting that in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., the Court repeatedly referred to the patent and
copyright statutes as if the same rules of interpretation applied to both.” (citation omitted)).
238. Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Patent misuse is
an affirmative defense to an accusation of patent infringement . . . .”). See Chisum, supra note 178,
§ 19.04 (Patent Misuse Defense).
239. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343–44 (1971) (“[T]he
Court has condemned attempts to broaden the physical or temporal scope of the patent monopoly.”)
(citing, inter alia, Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S.
488 (1942); Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917)); see also Chisum, supra note 178, § 19.04 (Patent Misuse
Defense); Robert J. Hoerner, The Decline (And Fall?) of the Patent Misuse Doctrine in the Federal
Circuit, 69 Antitrust L.J. 669, 669–73 (2001); Alfred C. Server et al., Reach-Through Rights and the
Patentability, Enforcement, and Licensing of Patents on Drug Discovery Tools, 1 Hastings Sci. & Tech.
L.J. 21, 65–75 (2009).
240. See Chisum, supra note 178, § 19.04 (Patent Misuse Defense); Server et al., supra note 239, at
65–75.
241. See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Hovenkamp,
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statutorily conferred patent monopoly. As discussed elsewhere in this
Article, the Supreme Court’s justification for patent exhaustion is that the
authorized first sale of a patented product places the product beyond the
limits of any patents that cover or are substantially embodied in that
242
product, thereby exhausting patent infringement remedies. In the case
of patent misuse, the Court has held that a contract provision extending
the physical or temporal scope of a patent that results from the leverage
provided by such patent is void and the patent is unenforceable until the
243
misuse ends and its consequences are dissipated. The latter doctrine’s
focus on patent scope makes it relevant to an analysis of whether a
contract-based restriction on a patented product following an authorized
first sale, which places the product outside of the patent monopoly, is
enforceable under state contract law.
However, patent exhaustion and patent misuse are separate
doctrines, despite their shared focus on the limits of the patent
monopoly. The beginning of the Supreme Court’s patent exhaustion
jurisprudence in McQuewan (1852) predates that of the Court’s patent
244
misuse jurisprudence in Motion Picture Patents (1917), indicating that
the exhaustion doctrine operates to eliminate patent infringement
remedies in the context of a violation of a post-sale restriction on a
patented product without reliance on the later-developed doctrine of
patent misuse. Moreover, the fact that the doctrines are distinguishable
justifies a separate assessment of the impact of the misuse doctrine on the
enforceability of a contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented
product through a breach of contract remedy from the one provided in
Part II.A.1 on the impact of the exhaustion doctrine. In this Part, we
undertake such an assessment and, based on a review of relevant Supreme
Court patent misuse jurisprudence, related Federal Circuit case law, and
an amendment to the federal patent statutes, we conclude that the patent
misuse doctrine does not mandate that every contract-based post-sale
restriction on a patented product is unenforceable under state law.
As discussed in Parts I.A and I.C, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Motion Picture Patents was critical to the development of the Court’s

supra note 8, at 491.
242. See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852) (“[W]hen the machine passes to the hands
of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly [created by Congress in enacting the
federal patent laws].”).
243. See supra notes 239, 240.
244. See Blonder-Tongue Labs, 402 U.S. at 343–44; Princo, 616 F.3d at 1326. Note that other
Supreme Court cases have been cited as the start of the Court’s patent misuse jurisprudence, such as
Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931) (cited by
Chisum, supra note 178, §19.04 [1] [b] (Patent Misuse Defense) (referring to the “Supreme Court
‘Tying’ Cases—Carbice, Morton & Mercoid”)), and Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488
(1942) (cited by Hoerner, supra note 239, at 670). Accepting either of these later cases as the Court’s
first application of the patent misuse doctrine does not undermine the point that that doctrine was
developed after the patent exhaustion doctrine.
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patent exhaustion jurisprudence in that it rejected the conditional sale
doctrine endorsed in its prior decision in Henry. The Motion Picture
Patents opinion is also significant in that it provides the first support for
the conclusion that not all contract-based post-sale restrictions on
patented products constitute patent misuse. The Court considered two
distinct issues in Motion Picture Patents. It first addressed the question of
whether, in contrast to the conditional sale doctrine, an authorized first
sale of a patented product invariably exhausts patent infringement
245
remedies. In concluding that such a sale does, indeed, exhaust patent
remedies, irrespective of any conditions that are attached to the sale, the
Court rejected the conditional sale doctrine and resolved the question
246
regarding the impact of patent exhaustion.
Not content to end the analysis there, and recognizing the need to
deal with the precedent set by its earlier pro-patent decision in Henry,
the Court in Motion Picture Patents then addressed the enforceability of
the particular post-sale restriction under consideration in the case which,
as in Henry, was a tying obligation placed on the buyer of the patented
247
product. The Court concluded that the provision at issue was evidence
of the patent holder’s effort “to, in effect, extend the scope of its patent
monopoly by restricting the use of it to materials necessary in its
operation, but which are no part of the patented invention . . . . The
248
patent law furnishes no warrant for such a practice . . . .” This is the
language of patent misuse, and many consider the Court’s decision in
Motion Picture Patents to be the beginning of the Supreme Court’s
249
patent misuse jurisprudence. In declaring the tying provision invalid as
an impermissible extension of patent scope, the Court in Motion Picture
Patents eliminated any argument that the provision was enforceable
250
under state contract law or any other legal theory. The point for our
245. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 515–16 (1917).
246. Id. See Part I.C.
247. Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 515–16, 518. See infra note 251.
248. Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 516–17.
249. See id. In rejecting the tying provision under consideration, the Court noted that such a
provision could be challenged as a violation of the Clayton Act, an antitrust statute enacted by
Congress in the interval between the Court’s decision in Henry and the decision that it was handing
down in Motion Picture Patents. While the Court in Motion Picture Patents did not explore the matter
further, it stated that “[o]ur conclusion [based on a patent misuse analysis] renders it unnecessary to
make the application of this statute to the case at bar which the Circuit Court of Appeals made of it
but it must be accepted by us as a most persuasive expression of the public policy of our country with
respect to the question before us.” Id. at 517–18.
250. Id. at 518. (“Coming now to the terms of the notice attached to the [film projecting] machine
sold . . . under the license of the plaintiff [and covered by the plaintiff’s patent in suit]. . . . This
notice . . . provides that the machine . . . may be used only with moving picture films containing the
invention of reissued [and subsequently expired] patent No. 12,192, so long as the plaintiff continues to
own this reissued patent. Such a restriction is invalid because such a film is obviously not any part of
the invention of the patent in suit; because it is an attempt, without statutory warrant, to continue the
patent monopoly in this particular character of film after it has expired, and because to enforce it
would be to create a monopoly in the manufacture and use of moving picture films, wholly outside of
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purposes is that the Court in Motion Picture Patents would not have
needed to delve into the particular problem raised by the tying provision
under consideration if the inclusion of any post-sale restriction on a
patented product in a contract between an authorized seller and a buyer
constituted an impermissible extension of the patent scope under the
misuse doctrine that rendered the restriction unenforceable under state
contract law. Instead, the Court focused on the particular provision
before it, supporting a case-by-case application of the patent misuse
doctrine in evaluating a post-sale restriction. In essence, the Court in
Motion Picture Patents applied the exhaustion doctrine to eliminate
patent infringement remedies. It relied on the misuse doctrine to void a
contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product, but only after
an evaluation of the nature and impact of the particular restriction under
consideration—in that case, a problematic tying provision.
The argument that every contract-based post-sale restriction on a
patented product is void under the misuse doctrine is based on the view
that the patent holder has misused the leverage of its patent by
attempting to exert downstream control over its patented product after
an authorized first sale has placed the product beyond the scope of the
patent. However, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Automatic Radio
251
Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. and Zenith Radio Corp.
252
v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. stand for the proposition that not all
contract-based extensions of patent scope constitute patent misuse.
These cases addressed the enforceability under state law of a
contract provision that calls for the payment of a total sales royalty in the
context of a patent license agreement. A total sales royalty obligation
requires a patent licensee to pay royalties on the sale of products that are
calculated not only on the sales of the products covered by the licensed
patent, but also on the sales of products that are not covered. Such an
253
obligation is clearly a physical extension of patent scope. The holdings
in Automatic Radio and Zenith reflect the Court’s conclusion that a
contract provision that obligates a patent licensee to pay a total sales
royalty is enforceable, provided that the inclusion of the provision in the
254
contract is not the result of coercion by the patent holder. This would

the patent in suit and of the patent law as we have interpreted it.” (paragraphing omitted)).
251. 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
252. 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
253. See Server et al., supra note 239, at 75–92.
254. See Zenith Radio, 395 U.S. at 138–39 (“If convenience of the parties [as in Automatic Radio]
rather than patent power [as in this case] dictates the total-sales royalty provision, there are no misuse
of the patents and no forbidden conditions attached to the license . . . . [W]e do not read Automatic
Radio to authorize the patentee to use the power of his patent to insist on a total-sales royalty and to
override protestations of the licensee that some of his products are unsuited to the patent or that for
some lines of his merchandise he has no need or desire to purchase the privileges of the patent.”);
Automatic Radio, 339 U.S. at 834 (1950) (“Sound business judgment could indicate that . . . [a total
sales royalty] payment represents the most convenient method of fixing the business value of the
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suggest, by analogy, that at least some mutually agreed-to, contract-based
post-sale restrictions placed on a patented product are enforceable under
contract law, despite the fact that the post-sale restriction would appear to
be an effort by the patent holder to extend the reach of its patent
monopoly.
Admittedly, the Automatic Radio/Zenith line of cases only addresses
contract provisions that extend the physical scope of the patent monopoly,
where a non-coerced agreement by the parties to a contract can avoid
255
patent misuse. The Supreme Court’s decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co.,
however, which addressed a temporal extension of patent scope, presents a
different challenge. In that case, the Court concluded that a contract
provision that required the user of a patented product to pay the same
royalty after the expiration of the applicable patents as it paid prior to
the expiration was an impermissible temporal extension of patent scope
that could not be contracted around, in other words, a per se patent
256
misuse violation.
It could be argued, by analogy, that every contract-based restriction
placed on a patented product following an authorized first sale that
exhausts the patent right with respect to that product is a per se patent
misuse violation, rendering the offending contract provision void under
Brulotte. This argument, however, neglects the fact that Brulotte was
actually a patent exhaustion case, as well as a patent misuse case, that
distinguished between the expiration of a patent and the exhaustion of a
patent with respect to an individual product. The patented hop-picking
machine at the center of the controversy in Brulotte was actually
257
purchased by the user. The post-sale restriction placed on the use of
the machine was in the form of a royalty burden that obligated the user
to pay royalties for the continued use of the machine even after the
258
patents covering the machine had expired. The Court ruled that the
survival of the post-sale restriction following the expiration of the relevant
259
patents was “a telltale sign” that the patent holder was attempting to
project its patent monopoly beyond the patent term and, therefore, a
per se patent misuse violation rendering the royalty payment provision
unenforceable. Of particular note, for our purposes, is the fact that the
payment provision was held to be unenforceable from the point in time at
which the patents expired, not from the point of patent exhaustion
260
triggered by the authorized sale of the machine. Stated another way, the
privileges granted by the licensing agreement.”).
255. 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
256. Id. at 32.
257. Id. at 29.
258. Id. at 29–30.
259. Id. at 32.
260. Id. at 30. (“Petitioners refused to make royalty payments accruing both before and after the
expiration of the patents. This suit followed. One defense was misuse of the patents through extension
of the license agreements beyond the expiration date of the patents. The trial court rendered judgment
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restriction placed on the patented product was held to be enforceable
under contract law, despite an authorized first sale that exhausted the
patent rights with respect to the product, until the time that the relevant
patents expired. According to this interpretation of the Court’s Brulotte
holding, the case provides additional support for the conclusion that not
every post-sale restriction on a patented product is unenforceable under
state contract law as a result of patent misuse.
The Federal Circuit’s patent misuse decisions have tended to raise
the threshold for a finding of misuse. For example, in Windsurfing
261
International, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., the Federal Circuit stated that the
“doctrine of patent misuse . . . requires that the alleged infringer show
that the patentee has impermissibly broadened the ‘physical or temporal
262
scope’ of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect,” citing the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
263
University of Illinois Foundation. However, the italicized language in
the above quotation was not part of the original statement in Blonder264
Tongue. The Federal Circuit added the words “with anticompetitive
effect,” and in so doing, arguably, raised the bar for a finding of patent
265
misuse. Any broadening of the physical or temporal scope of the patent
grant by the patent holder had to have an anticompetitive effect to
constitute patent misuse.
266
In Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., the Federal Circuit
added that an anticompetitive effect alone does not itself require a finding
of patent misuse. Rather, such an effect must outweigh any procompetitive
benefits of the challenged practice, when “analyzed in accordance with the
267
And in Princo Corp. v. International Trade
‘rule of reason.’”

for respondent and the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed. . . . We conclude that the judgment
below must be reversed insofar as it allows royalties to be collected which accrued after the last of the
patents incorporated into the machines had expired.”).
261. 782 F.2d 995 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
262. Id. at 1001 (emphasis added).
263. 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971).
264. Id. (“[T]he Court has condemned attempts to broaden the physical or temporal scope of the
patent monopoly.”).
265. See Server et al., supra note 239, at 71 n.140; see also Hoerner, supra note 239 (arguing that
the Federal Circuit has departed from Supreme Court precedent by requiring a showing of
‘anticompetitive effect,’ which analysis is derived from the antitrust rule of reason, in order to sustain a
patent misuse defense); Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse,
55 Hastings L.J. 399, 418–31 (2003) (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s inconsistent effort “to change
patent misuse doctrine so that it tracks antitrust doctrine” has resulted in “a confusing tangle that
distorts both antitrust and misuse doctrine”); Patricia A. Martone & Richard M. Feustel, Jr., The
Patent Misuse Defense—Does It Still Have Viability, in Intellectual Property Antitrust 213, 250
(2002) (noting that, contrary to Supreme Court precedent, the Federal Circuit has required “antitrusttype findings” to support an “attempt to extend the scope of monopoly”-type patent misuse defense).
266. 133 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
267. Id. at 869 (“If . . . the practice [alleged to constitute patent misuse] has the effect of extending the
patentee’s statutory rights and does so with anti-competitive effect, that practice must then be analyzed in
accordance with the ‘rule of reason.’ Under the rule of reason, ‘the finder of fact must decide whether the
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268

Commission, the Federal Circuit’s latest substantive decision regarding
patent misuse, the court narrowed the type of anticompetitive behavior
269
that qualifies as patent misuse. The net effect of these restatements by
the Federal Circuit of the law of patent misuse is that it is virtually
270
impossible, under that court’s narrow reading of the misuse doctrine,
that a contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product would be
deemed patent misuse without an assessment of the nature and effect of
the restriction at issue. Whether or not the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation of the misuse doctrine is an accurate reflection of Supreme
271
Court patent misuse jurisprudence, it remains good law and must be
considered in any assessment of whether a contract-based post-sale
restriction on a patented product constitutes per se patent misuse,
rendering the restriction unenforceable under state contract law.
Finally, a 1988 amendment to the federal patent statute provides
further support for the conclusion that not all post-sale restrictions on
patented products are void as a result of patent misuse. The Patent Misuse
272
Reform Act added § 271(d) to the patent statute. Section 271(d)(5)
states, in part, that

questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of
factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.’” (citation omitted)).
268. 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
269. Id. at 1329 (“Recognizing the narrow scope of the doctrine, we have emphasized that the
defense of patent misuse is not available to a presumptive infringer simply because a patentee engages
in some kind of wrongful commercial conduct, even conduct that may have anticompetitive
effects. . . . . While proof of an antitrust violation shows that the patentee has committed wrongful
conduct having anticompetitive effects, that does not establish misuse of the patent in suit unless the
conduct in question restricts the use of that patent and does so in one of the specific ways that have
been held to be outside the otherwise broad scope of the patent grant.” (citation omitted)).
270. Id. at 1321 (“Patent misuse developed as a nonstatutory defense to claims of patent
infringement. In the licensing context, the doctrine limits a patentee’s right to impose conditions on a
licensee that exceeds the scope of the patent right. Because patent misuse is a judge-made doctrine
that is in derogation of statutory patent rights against infringement, this court has not applied the
doctrine of patent misuse expansively.”).
271. See Server et al., supra note 239, at 70–71 (“It is noteworthy that the Federal Circuit’s
analytical framework for identifying patent misuse has been the object of criticism by commentators.
The view generally expressed is that, in contrast to Supreme Court precedent, the Federal Circuit has
conflated the ‘antitrust type’ of patent misuse and the ‘extension of monopoly type’ of patent misuse,
such that from the Federal Circuit’s prospective ‘no misuse of any kind can be found unless the patent
infringement defendant proves that the alleged misuse had ‘anticompetitive effect not justifiable under
the rule of reason.’ The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the patent misuse doctrine, which appears
to ignore the pure ‘extension of monopoly type’ misuse, raises the threshold for a showing of patent
misuse and, according to some, reflects that court’s antipathy to the doctrine in keeping with its propatent bias.” (footnotes omitted)). See supra note 265.
272. See Princo, 616 F.3d at 1329–30; Chisum, supra note 178, § 19.04 (Patent Misuse Defense:
[i] Historical Development & [f] The Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988); Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent
Misuse and Antitrust Reform: “Blessed Be the Tie?,” 4 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 1, 21–26 (1991); Richard
Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act and Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38 Drake L. Rev. 175, 192–200 (1988).
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[n]o patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his
having . . . conditioned the . . . sale of the patented product on the . . .
purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the
patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the . . .
273
patented product on which the . . . sale is conditioned.

The qualifier “otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory
infringement of a patent” allows for the unavoidable effect of patent
exhaustion in eliminating patent infringement remedies against a buyer of
the patented product who fails to comply with a post-sale restriction on the
use or disposition of the product. However, the avoidance of patent misuse
in conditioning the sale of a patented product would enable a patent
holder to preserve its right to pursue a third party infringer of the relevant
patent who had no connection to the product sale. Accordingly, guidance
as to the actions that a patent holder could undertake in the context of
selling its patented product that would not be deemed patent misuse is of
considerable value. Section 271(d)(5) provides such guidance with its
statement that, in the absence of market power, a tying restriction that
obligates a buyer of a patented product to purchase another product,
possibly for post-sale use with the patented product, is not a type of misuse
or a legal extension of the patent right that would render the restriction
unenforceable through a breach of contract remedy. Here then is statutory
support for the conclusion that not all contract-based post-sale restrictions
on patented products constitute patent misuse, rendering the restriction
unenforceable under state contract law.
3.

Is a Contract-Based Post-Sale Restriction on a Patented
Product Void as Against the Public Policies Against Restraints
on Alienation and Restraints of Trade?

The final argument to be addressed against the enforceability of any
contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product is that such a
restriction conflicts with the public policies against restraints on
alienation and restraints of trade. This argument has been cited as a basis
274
for patent exhaustion and has been relied on in efforts to void contract-

273. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012).
274. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516–17 (1917) (“[I]t
is not competent for the owner of a patent, by notice attached to its machine . . . to send its machines
forth into the channels of trade of the country subject to conditions as to use or royalty to be paid . . . .
The patent law furnishes no warrant for such a practice, and the cost, inconvenience, and annoyance to
the public which the opposite conclusion would occasion forbid it.”); Straus v. Victor Talking Mach.
Co., 243 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1917) (“Courts would be perversely blind if they failed to look through such an
attempt as this ‘License Notice’ [to fix the resale price of a patented sound-producing machine] thus
plainly is to sell property for a full price, and yet to place restraints upon its further alienation, such as
have been hateful to the law from Lord Coke’s day to ours, because obnoxious to the public interest.”).
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based post-sale restrictions on both patented and unpatented products.
The question to be answered in this Part is whether these public policy
arguments are sufficiently compelling to render every contract-based
post-sale restriction on a patented product unenforceable.
The argument that a contract-based post-sale restriction on a product
contravenes the public policies against restraints on alienation and
restraints of trade was presented and accepted by the Supreme Court in
276
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. (overruled in Leegin
277
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. ). Dr. Miles involved a series
of contracts through which the manufacturer of a proprietary medicine,
whose formula and method of preparation were not patented but instead
278
kept secret, attempted to control the sale price of the medicine. The
contracts were between the manufacturer and selected vendors (i.e.,
jobbers, wholesale druggists, and retailers) and specified the parties to
279
whom, and the minimum price at which, the medicine could be sold. It
was alleged that the defendant in the case, who was not in privity of
contract with the manufacturer, had purchased the medicine from
various vendors in violation of the latters’ contractual obligation to the
280
manufacturer and was selling the medicine below the specified price.
While the defendant was charged with tortious interference with the
contractual relationship between the manufacturer and its vendors, the
case addressed the legality of the system of contracts that placed
281
In
restrictions on the proprietary medicine following its sale.
concluding that the contract restrictions in Dr. Miles were unenforceable,
the Court relied on the public policies against restraints on alienation
and restraints of trade. With respect to restraints on alienation, the Court
stated the following:
We come, then, to the . . . question, whether the complainant . . . is
entitled to maintain the restrictions by virtue of the fact that they relate
to products of its own manufacture.
The basis of the argument appears to be that, as the manufacturer
may make and sell, or not, as he chooses, he may affix conditions as to
the use of the article or as to the prices at which purchasers may

275. See Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. 502; Straus, 243 U.S. 490; Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907).
276. 220 U.S. 373.
277. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
278. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 374.
279. Id. at 374–81.
280. Id. at 381–82.
281. The manufacturer in Dr. Miles argued that certain of its vendors (i.e., jobbers and wholesale
druggists) were acting as its agents, having never obtained title to the proprietary medicine, and that
the contractual restrictions placed on these vendors did not burden a product that had been sold. The
Supreme Court rejected this view on the theory that the contractual scheme under consideration in the
case was sufficiently broad to obligate vendors who clearly obtained title to the medicine (e.g.,
retailers and wholesalers who purchased from other wholesalers) to adhere to the manufacturer’s
restrictions regarding resale of the product. Id. at 379–81.
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dispose of it. The propriety of the restraint is sought to be derived from
the liberty of the producer.
But because a manufacturer is not bound to make or sell, it does not
follow in case of sales actually made he may impose upon purchasers
every sort of restriction. Thus a general restraint upon alienation is
ordinarily invalid. “The right of alienation is one of the essential
incidents of a right of general property in movables, and restraints
upon alienation have been generally regarded as obnoxious to public
policy, which is best subserved by great freedom of traffic in such
things as pass from hand to hand. General restraint in the alienation of
articles, things, chattels . . . have been generally held void. ‘If a man,’
says Lord Coke, . . . ‘be possessed of a horse or any other chattel, real
or personal, and give [or sell] his whole interest or property therein,
upon condition that the donee or vendee shall not alien the same, the
same is void, because the whole interest and property is out of him, so
as he hath no possibility of reverter; and it is against trade and traffic
282
and bargaining and contracting between man and man.’”

In rejecting the contracts under consideration as unlawful restraints
of trade, the Dr. Miles Court relied on English case law:
“The true view at the present time,” said Lord Macnaghten in Nordenfelt
v. Maxim Nordenfelt, “I think, is this: The public have an interest in
every person’s carrying on his trade freely: so has the individual. All
interference with individual liberty of action in trading, and all restraints
of trade of themselves, if there is nothing more, are contrary to public
283
policy, and therefore void. That is the general rule.”

The Supreme Court in Dr. Miles established a per se rule against a
vertical restraint in the form of a minimum resale price restriction. In its
284
subsequent decisions in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.
285
(overruled in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. ) and Albrecht
286
287
v. Herald Co. (overruled in State Oil Co. v. Khan ), the Court extended
the per se rule to include post-sale non-price vertical restraints and
maximum resale price restrictions. Each of these subsequent decisions
relied on the argument set forth in Dr. Miles to conclude that the vertical
restraint under consideration contravened the public policies against
288
restraints on alienation and restraints of trade.
282. Id. at 404–05.
283. Id. at 406.
284. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
285. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
286. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
287. 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
288. The Supreme Court in Dr. Miles cited public policy arguments against restraints on alienation
and restraints of trade to conclude that the minimum resale price restriction under consideration was
per se illegal under common law and Sherman Act § 1. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 409. The Court in
Schwinn relied on Dr. Miles in holding that post-sale non-price vertical restraints were a per se illegal
restraint of trade under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 382. The Schwinn Court also
noted, citing Dr. Miles, that the restraints under consideration were a violation of the “ancient rule
against restraints on alienation.” Id. at 380. The Court in Albrecht relied on United States v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960), which in turn relied on Dr. Miles, to conclude that maximum resale
price restrictions were a per se violation under Sherman Act § 1. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 149–50.
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The products under consideration in Dr. Miles, Schwinn, and Albrecht
289
were not patented. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider whether the
rules against restraints on alienation and restraints of trade also apply to
post-sale restrictions on patented products. While the Supreme Court in
290
291
Dr. Miles failed to resolve this issue, it cited with approval the opinion
of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in John D. Park & Sons Co.
v. Hartman—a case with a fact pattern that was strikingly similar to that in
Dr. Miles—that indicated that the public policies against vertical restraints
would have the same invalidating impact on post-sale restrictions on at
292
least certain patented products as on non-patented products. As the Sixth
Circuit in Hartman explained, “the exemption from the rule against
restraint has never been extended to contracts in respect of articles made
under a patent which have once passed beyond the domain of the patent
293
by an original sale without restriction.”
The Sixth Circuit’s “without restriction” qualifier in the above
quotation was a reflection of the growing acceptance of the conditional
sale doctrine, which was first articulated by Judge Lurton in Heaton294
Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co. and allowed for
an extension of a patentee’s control through the conditioning of the sale
of a patented product. Lurton’s involvement in the decisions discussed in
this Part is especially noteworthy, as he delivered the Sixth Circuit’s
opinions in both Dr. Miles and Hartman, sat on the Supreme Court at the
time of its Dr. Miles decision (although he took no part in the
consideration of the decision of that case) and, within months of the
Court’s Dr. Miles decision, authored the Court’s opinion in Henry v.
Dick (subsequently overruled by Motion Picture Patents), which
provided the Supreme Court’s only endorsement of Button-Fastener’s
295
In Part I.C.2, we argued that Quanta
conditional sale doctrine.
effectively rejected the conditional sale doctrine, holding that an
authorized first sale of a patented product exhausts the relevant patent
with respect to the product sold, irrespective of any condition placed on
the buyer. If our interpretation is correct, then the “without restriction”
qualifier in the Hartman quote can be ignored and a patented product
289. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 147–48; Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 379 n.6; Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 382; see infra
note 290.
290. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 382 (“The complainant has no statutory grant. So far as appears, there
are no letters patent relating to the remedies in question. The complainant has not seen fit to make the
disclosure required by the statute, and thus to secure the privileges it confers. Its case lies outside the
policies of the patent law, and the extent of the right which that law secures is not here involved or
determined.”). See Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 379 n.6 (“We have no occasion here to consider whether a
patentee has any greater rights in this respect [i.e., that a manufacturer who has sold his product may
no longer control it].”).
291. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 409.
292. John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907).
293. Id. at 32.
294. 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896).
295. See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1912).
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following an authorized sale falls into the same category as an
unpatented product with respect to the application of the rules against
vertical restraints. The point is that it is reasonable to ask, in light of the
early case law regarding vertical restraints, whether the public policies
against restraints on alienation and restraints of trade would invalidate
every contract-based post sale restriction on a patented product.
The answer, as discussed below, is that the Supreme Court’s
subsequent rulings regarding vertical restraints do not mandate that every
contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product be voided as an
unlawful restraint on alienation and restraint of trade. Since its decisions in
Dr. Miles, Schwinn, and Albrecht, Supreme Court jurisprudence with
respect to vertical restraints has evolved with the changing times and such
restraints are no longer considered per se unlawful, but instead are
assessed on a case-by-case basis under the rule of reason. Each of the
above noted cases was explicitly overruled by the Court (Dr. Miles in
Leegin, Schwinn in Continental T.V., and Albrecht in Khan), marking a
pronounced and consistent shift in the Court’s application of the public
policies against restraints on alienation and restraints of trade in the
context of contract-based, post-sale vertical restrictions. In fact, despite
its finding of a per se violation, the Dr. Miles Court anticipated this shift:
With respect to contracts in restraint of trade, the earlier doctrine of the
common law has been substantially modified in adaptation to modern
conditions. But the public interest is still the first consideration. To
sustain the restraint, it must be found to be reasonable both with respect
to the public and to the parties and that it is limited to what is fairly
necessary, in the circumstances of the particular case, for the protection
of the covenantee. Otherwise restraints of trade are void as against
public policy. As was said by this court in Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas.
Co.,“The decision in Mitchel v. Reynolds, is the foundation of the rule in
relation to the invalidity of contracts in restraint of trade; but as it was
made under a condition of things and a state of society different from
those which now prevail, the rule laid down is not regarded as inflexible,
and has been considerably modified. Public welfare is first considered,
and if it be not involved, and the restraint upon one party is not greater
than protection to the other party requires, the contract may be
sustained. The question is, whether, under the particular circumstances
of the case and the nature of the particular contract involved in it, the
296
contract is, or is not, unreasonable.”

The Supreme Court in Dr. Miles relied on the public policies against
restraints on alienation and restraints of trade to reject a vertical minimum
price restraint as a per se violation of both the common law and a federal
297
antitrust statute. The vertical restraints under consideration in Schwinn
and in Albrecht were rejected strictly on antitrust grounds as contravening
298
§ 1 of the Sherman Act. At the time of these subsequent decisions,
296. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 406 (citations omitted).
297. See supra note 288.
298. See supra note 288.
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however, it had long been recognized that the Sherman Act embodied the
299
common law and should be treated as a common law statute. Moreover,
“just as the common law adapts to modern understanding and greater
experience, so too does the Sherman Act’s prohibition on ‘restraint[s] of
300
trade’ evolve to meet the dynamics of present economic conditions.”
301
In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., which overruled
Schwinn, the Court finally recognized that changed economic conditions
required a shift in its treatment of vertical restraints from the application
302
of a per se rule to a rule of reason analysis. In State Oil Co. v. Khan
(which overruled Albrecht) and in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc.
303
v. PSKS, Inc. (which overruled Dr. Miles), the Court applied the same
reasoning to reject the per se invalidation of the vertical restraints under
consideration in those cases. For our purposes, it is clear that the Court has
adopted the view that a case-by-case, rule of reason approach should be
taken in assessing the legality (whether under common law or the antitrust
statutes) of a vertical restraint such as a contract-based post-sale restriction
on a patented product. A per se rule that every such restriction is unlawful,
irrespective of the nature of the restriction and its economic effect, is
incompatible with such a view.
Finally, we should note that certain vertical restraints in the form of
personal property servitudes, which “run with the goods” to bind
downstream purchasers who are not in privity of contract with the original
304
seller, have been judged to be enforceable. The enforceability of such
vertical restraints provides additional support for our conclusion that at
least some contract-based post-sale restrictions on patented products are
lawful.
The post-sale vertical restraints under consideration in this Article are
contract-based and apply to the purchaser of a patented product who has
entered into some form of binding agreement with an authorized seller.

299. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 887, 899 (2007) (“From the
beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common law statute.”); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l
Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (“Congress . . . did not intend the text of the
Sherman Act to delineate the full meaning of the statute or its application in concrete situations. The
legislative history makes it perfectly clear that it expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s
broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.”).
300. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899 (alteration in original).
301. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
302. 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
303. 551 U.S. 887 (2007).
304. See Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1449, 1455–60 (2004),
for a review of the following four cases in which a servitude was enforced by a court: TransWorld
Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Coupon Exch., Inc., 913 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1990); Tri-Continental Fin. Corp. v.
Tropical Marine Enters. Co., 265 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1959); Nadell & Co. v. Grasso, 175 Cal. App. 2d
420 (1959); Clairol, Inc. v. Sarann Co., Inc., 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 433 (Ct. Com. Pl., Pa. 1965); see also
Robinson, supra, at 1484 (“In fact, as we have seen, courts have recognized such servitudes on
occasion, sometimes explicitly and sometimes in the guise of other doctrinal categories such as tortious
interference with contract.”).
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Likewise, the vertical restraints addressed in the cases reviewed above in
this Part were placed on the buyer through a contract with the
305
manufacturer in the context of the sale of a product. In contrast, a
personal property servitude is a
non-contractual method of equitable servitudes . . . [that] bind[s]
successive sub-purchasers. The manufacturer place[s] a notice on the
chattel or its container, specifying the restriction which [is] to bind all
later owners, and in this way, anyone who acquire[s] the article, no
matter how numerous the intervening sales, [is] prevented from being
306
a purchaser without notice of the restriction.

In that sense, a personal property servitude “runs with the goods” in the
absence of any contract with a seller. However, as with contract-based
vertical restraints, personal property servitudes have been challenged as
contravening the public policies against restraints on alienation and
307
restraints of trade. In fact, on the basis of the greater impact of personal
property servitudes (which bind all downstream purchasers in the absence
of a contractual obligation) such restraints are considered more onerous
than those limited to a buyer bound by an agreed-to contract obligation,
308
and are generally disfavored. Nevertheless, the courts have, on occasion,
rejected the public policy arguments against personal property servitudes
309
and found them to be enforceable. In those instances, there were other
considerations that supported the enforcement of the restraint, such as
310
protecting the consumer from harm and preserving the goodwill of a
311
business. The point for our purposes is that even in the absence of a
305. In each of Dr. Miles, Schwinn, Continental T.V., Khan, and Leegin, the vertical restraint under
consideration was incorporated into an agreement between the manufacturer of a product and its
buyer. In Albrecht, however, the vertical maximum price restriction at issue was being forced upon a
buyer through a combination that included the manufacturer and other parties. This distinction did
not alter the Court’s finding of a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, which applies to
combinations as well as contracts, and is not relevant to the point being made in this paragraph
regarding the “non-contractual” nature of a personal property servitude.
306. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 945, 953 (1928).
307. See Robinson, supra note 304, at 1484 (“[C]ases disallowing servitude restrictions on personal
property have done so . . . because they run afoul of some exogenous public policy, such as that against
alienability restraints or restraint of trade.”).
308. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 Geo. L.J. 885, 924 (2008) (“The
costs associated with chattel servitudes are attributable in part to the features that problematic chattel
servitudes share with problematic land servitudes: the remote and indefinite relationship between the
parties to be benefited and burdened . . . .”).
309. See supra note 304.
310. In Clairol, Inc. v. Sarann Co., Inc., 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 433 (1964), the court ruled that the
manufacturer of a hair care product placed an enforceable equitable servitude on the product by
printing on bottles intended for professional use only the legend “Professional Use Only.” The
manufacturer argued that the sale of such bottles, which lacked the necessary instructions for safe and
effective use, to non-professional retail customers subjected such customers to potential harm and the
risk of unsatisfactory results. The court agreed and, in support of the manufacturer’s effort to protect
both the public and its goodwill, enjoined the defendant from making any further sales of such bottles
to retail customers.
311. In Nadell v. Grasso, 175 Cal. App. 2d 420 (1959), the court ruled that an equitable servitude
on chattel was created when a dealer in food products damaged in transit agreed that the product
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contractual obligation on a buyer, a post-sale vertical restraint may be
enforceable, despite the public policies against restraints on alienation and
restraints of trade. As noted above, this observation is consistent with our
view that not every contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented
product is unlawful.
B. If Some Contract-Based Restrictions Are Enforceable, Which
Ones and What Benefit Do They Confer?
Based on our analysis in the preceding Part, we have concluded that
not every contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product is void
and, accordingly, a determination of the enforceability of any such
restriction will require a case-by-case assessment of the restriction. This
case-by-case approach is consistent with the settled expectations of
practicing transactional attorneys and their clients, who frequently include
post-sale restrictions in their contracts. In this Part, we present an
approach to assessing the enforceability of contract-based post-sale
restrictions under state law and apply the approach in the analysis of a
representative restriction. We also discuss the relative benefit to a patent
holder of a breach of contract remedy as compared to a patent
infringement remedy.
1.

Approach to Assessing the Enforceability of a Contract-Based
Post-Sale Restriction on a Patented Product

Assuming that the first sale of a patented product is authorized and
that the post-sale restriction under consideration is incorporated into a
312
valid contract, the following issues should be considered in determining
whether the restriction is enforceable through a breach of contract
remedy under applicable state law: First, determine whether an objective
of federal patent law preempts the enforcement of the particular
restriction under consideration. The preemption standard articulated by
the Supreme Court in Bonito Boats provides guidance for making such a
determination, with a focus on whether a state is attempting to confer
“patent-like protection” on an idea “in the public domain.” Moreover, the
approach to patent law preemption reflected in the Lear balancing test is
particularly well-suited to an assessment of the enforceability of a contract

would not enter the retail market in the manufacturer’s original jars. Acknowledging the importance
of preserving the goodwill of a business, the court enforced the restriction against a party that
subsequently purchased the product with notice of the restriction, despite a lack of privity between the
dealer and the subsequent purchaser; see Clairol, 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 433, discussed supra note 310.
312. In this Article, we have not addressed the requirements that a post-sale restriction must meet
to constitute a legally binding contract between a patent holder and a buyer of its patented product.
We have assumed that a patent holder who intends to rely on a breach of contract remedy to enforce a
post-sale restriction against a buyer who fails to honor the restriction will obtain the necessary legal
advice to present the restriction in a form that documents the requisite “meeting of the minds” under
applicable state contract law to be binding.
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provision under state law. As discussed in Part II.A.1, that approach
includes the identification of the patent law objective being threatened by
the contract restriction and a determination of the degree of interference
with that objective. Second, consider whether the inclusion of the
313
restriction in a contract constitutes patent misuse. The Federal Circuit
provided an analytical framework for a finding of patent misuse in its
314
decision in Virginia Panel. In the words of the Federal Circuit:
The courts have identified certain specific practices as constituting per
se patent misuse, including so-called “tying” arrangements in which a
patentee conditions a license under the patent on the purchase of a
separable, staple good, and arrangements in which a patentee effectively
extends the term of its patent by requiring post-expiration royalties.
Congress, however, has established that other specific practices may not
support a finding of patent misuse. A 1988 amendment to § 271(d)
provides that, inter alia, in the absence of market power, even a tying
arrangement does not constitute patent misuse.
When a practice alleged to constitute patent misuse is neither per se
patent misuse nor specifically excluded from a misuse analysis by
§ 271(d), a court must determine if that practice is “reasonably within
the patent grant, i.e., that it relates to subject matter within the scope of
the patent claims.” If so, the practice does not have the effect of
broadening the scope of the patent claims and thus cannot constitute
patent misuse. If, on the other hand, the practice has the effect of
extending the patentee’s statutory rights and does so with an anticompetitive effect, that practice must then be analyzed in accordance
with the “rule of reason.” Under the rule of reason, “the finder of fact
must decide whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable
restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of factors,
including specific information about the relevant business, its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history,
315
nature, and effect.”

Third, determine whether the contract restriction violates antitrust law.
316
This analysis can overlap, but is not identical to, a patent misuse analysis
and, as discussed in Part III.A.3, relies on the case-by-case, rule of reason
approach adopted by the Supreme Court in evaluating vertical restraints.

313. The fact that the Supreme Court’s patent exhaustion jurisprudence predates its patent misuse
jurisprudence eliminates the argument that, as in the case of patent exhaustion, the Keeler quote
discussed in Part II.A.1 can be relied on to support the conclusion that an effort to enforce a post-sale
restriction on a patented product under state contract law can never constitute patent misuse. Recall that
the Court in Keeler expressed no opinion as to whether a contract-based post-sale restriction on a
patented product is enforceable under contract law, but viewed it as “obvious that such a question would
arise as a question of contract, and not as one under the inherent meaning and effect of the patent laws.”
Keeler v. Standard Folding-Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895). While patent misuse, like patent
exhaustion, is a doctrine that emanates from “the inherent meaning and effect of the patent laws,” Keeler
was decided in 1895, at least twenty-two years before the Supreme Court began its formulation of the
patent misuse doctrine in Motion Picture Patents. The better argument is that the Keeler quotation set a
limit on the reach of patent exhaustion but has no bearing on the scope of patent misuse.
314. 133 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
315. Id. at 869 (citations omitted).
316. The overlap of an antitrust analysis with a patent misuse analysis is discussed in Part II.B.2.
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Finally, determine whether public policy considerations (e.g., regarding
public health and safety) are relevant to an assessment of the
enforceability of the contract-based post-sale restriction. Such
considerations may shift the balance in favor of enforcing the restriction
under state law, as was noted in Part II.A.1 with respect to the Lear
approach to patent law preemption and in Part II.A.3 with respect to the
enforcement of a personal property servitude, and as will be discussed
below with respect to the rule of reason analysis required for
determining whether a restriction violates patent misuse or antitrust law.
2.

Assessment of a Representative Contract Restriction

A comprehensive assessment of the various product-related contract
restrictions that can be placed by a patent holder on the buyer of its
patented product as a condition of the sale is beyond the scope of this
Article. However, a brief discussion of one such restriction is useful in
demonstrating the application of the analytical approach to enforceability
described in Part II.B.1. Considering the central role that the Mallinckrodt
case has played in defining the scope of patent exhaustion and in
determining the types of remedies available for a buyer’s breach of a
contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product, it seems
fitting to address the enforceability of the “single-use only” restriction on
a patented medical device that was at issue in that case. Assuming that
the first sale of the product is authorized and that the single-use only
restriction placed by the patent holder on the buyer is part of a contract
that meets the requirements for a binding agreement under applicable
317
state contract law, the question is whether the restriction is enforceable
through a breach of contract remedy.
The Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt acknowledged the possibility of
multiple remedies in the event of the failure of the buyer of the patented
medical device to honor the single-use only restriction, that is, a patent
infringement remedy and a breach of contract remedy. In Mallinckrodt,
no breach of contract action was brought and, accordingly, the court
318
focused its analysis on the patent infringement remedy. As discussed in

317. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt did not consider
whether inscribing the “single use only” restriction on Mallinckrodt’s patented medical device or
including the restriction in a package insert that accompanied each device was legally sufficient under
state contract law to form a binding agreement between Mallinckrodt and the hospitals that purchased
the device. As the Federal Circuit explained, “[t]he district court did not decide whether the form of
the ‘single use only’ notice was legally sufficient to constitute a . . . condition of the sale from
Mallinckrodt to the hospitals. The district court also specifically stated that it was not deciding whether
Mallinckrodt could enforce this notice under contract law. These aspects are not presented on this
appeal.” Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 701 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see supra note 312.
318. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 707 n.6 (“We agree that a patentee may choose among alternate
remedies, but to deny a patentee access to statutory remedies is to withhold the protection of the law.
Thus whether Mallinckrodt may also have a remedy outside of the patent law is not before us.”); see
B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[V]iolation of valid

628

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:561

Part I.C, the weight of the evidence indicates that Mallinckrodt’s
conditional sale doctrine is no longer good law, limiting the possibility of
a patent infringement remedy as a result of patent exhaustion. Thus, the
breach of contract remedy remains the only possible recourse for the
patent holder. While the Federal Circuit did not rely on that remedy in
Mallinckrodt for enforcement of the single-use only restriction, aspects of
its opinion in the case are directly relevant to our enforceability analysis.
319
As the Federal Circuit noted in Braun in summarizing its Mallinckrodt
holding, “express conditions accompanying the sale . . . of a patented
product are generally upheld. Such express conditions, however, are
contractual in nature and are subject to antitrust, patent, contract, and any
other applicable law, as well as equitable considerations such as patent
misuse. Accordingly, conditions that violate some law or equitable
320
consideration are unenforceable.”
The first issue to address in the enforceability analysis outlined in
Part II.B.1 is whether enforcement of the single-use only restriction
under state law is preempted as inconsistent with an objective of federal
patent law. The argument in favor of preemption is that since an
authorized first sale of the restricted product moves the product outside
of the limits of the patent monopoly, an effort by the patent holder to
control the downstream use of the product through a contract restriction
contravenes the patent law objective of leaving ideas in the public
domain available for unencumbered use. This is the same issue that was
addressed in Part II.A.1 in our consideration of the enforceability—in
the face of a patent law preemption challenge—of contract-based postsales restrictions in general. Our analysis yielded a conclusion that such a
challenge would not be effective in voiding the restriction and a singleuse-only restriction presents no new issue that would alter that
321
conclusion. If anything, the public policy considerations raised in the
Mallinckrodt case (and discussed below in this Part) regarding the safety
of the public and the preservation of the goodwill of a business would tip
the balance in favor of enforcing a single-use only restriction under the
Lear approach to patent law preemption.
On its face, then, a single-use only restriction does not violate an
objective of federal patent law requiring preemption of an effort to
enforce such a restriction under state law. However, consideration of
conditions entitles the patentee to a remedy for either patent infringement or breach of contract.”
(citing Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 707 n.6)).
319. Braun, 124 F.3d at 1426.
320. Id. (citations omitted).
321. The Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt did not consider this preemption issue since in the absence
of patent exhaustion—which was avoided through the court’s reliance on the conditional sale doctrine—
the product remained within the limits of the patent monopoly following its sale, and enforcement of the
single-use only restriction under state contract law presented no apparent conflict with the objectives of
federal patent law. Viewed from the Federal Circuit’s perspective, a breach of contract remedy
complimented a patent infringement remedy, rather than serving as a potential substitute.
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such a restriction raises a noteworthy preemption issue not addressed
elsewhere in this Article. Recall that in justifying the Mallinckrodt court’s
reliance on the conditional sale doctrine to avoid patent exhaustion, the
Federal Circuit in Braun rejected the single reward interpretation of
patent exhaustion—suggested by the Supreme Court in Bloomer v.
322
323
Millinger and Hobbie v. Jennison —that a patent holder that sells its
patented product is entitled to only a single payment at the time of the
sale, and upon receipt of that consideration its right to exert downstream
control over the buyer’s use of the product through the threat of a patent
infringement action is exhausted. According to the Federal Circuit in
Braun, the better argument is that “it is more reasonable to infer that the
parties negotiated a price that reflects only the value of the ‘use’ rights
324
conferred by the patentee.”
Such an argument anticipates a reasonable addition to a single-use
only restriction on a patented product, that is, that only a single use is
permitted following the sale of the product unless the buyer agrees to pay
to the patentee a royalty for each subsequent use. This addition to the single325
use only restriction is referred to as a “double royalty” obligation. It can
be argued that a contractual obligation of this type, yielding multiple
rewards for the patent holder, conflicts with the federal patent law’s
carefully balanced objective of promoting “invention while at the same
326
time preserving free competition.” The patent statute is intended to
reward the inventor only to the extent necessary to promote invention
for the public good. Over-rewarding the inventor through multiple
payments (as some might argue would be the case in the event of the
payment on the sale of a patented product followed by subsequent
royalty payments on use) could be viewed as providing an unnecessary
bonus to the inventor, while burdening (through a royalty obligation) a
purchased product with respect to which the patent holder’s patent has
been exhausted. To the extent that the doctrine of patent exhaustion was
327
developed to deal with this concern, enforcement of a double royalty

322. 68 U.S. 340 (1863). See supra note 27.
323. 149 U.S. 355 (1893).
324. Braun, 124 F.3d at 1426.
325. See infra note 327.
326. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230–31 (1964).
327. See LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., No. C 01-00326, 2002 WL 31996860, at *4
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (“The patent exhaustion doctrine . . . is designed to prevent a patentee from receiving
a double royalty on a single patented invention.”). It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court in its
Quanta opinion did not comment on, and thereby passed on an opportunity to endorse, this statement
by the district court in the case, which is based on the single reward interpretation of patent
exhaustion. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 513 (“One historical concern that the courts raised in
first sale cases was that permitting the patentee to place post-sale license restrictions on patented
goods would entitle the patentee to collect multiple royalties.”); John W. Osborne, A Coherent View
of Patent Exhaustion: A Standard Based on Patentable Distinctiveness, 20 Santa Clara Computer &
High Tech. L.J. 643, 668 (2004) (“Precluding a double recovery for practice of a patent claim will . . .
obviate the applicability of the patent exhaustion doctrine.”).
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obligation through a breach of contract remedy could be viewed as an
impermissible attempt to contract around patent exhaustion.
While the debate regarding the enforceability of a contract obligation
328
to pay a double royalty continues, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Brulotte provides an effective counter to arguments against the
enforcement of such an obligation under state contract law. As discussed
in Part II.A.2, the Court in Brulotte held that the restriction placed by the
buyer of the patented product at issue in the form of an ongoing royalty
obligation based on use following an initial payment made by the buyer
upon the authorized first sale was enforceable through a breach of
329
contract remedy until the applicable patents expired. While this
holding raises a general question as to the enforceability of contractbased post-sale restrictions on patented products following expiration or
330
invalidation of the applicable patents, it supports a conclusion that an
ongoing royalty payment obligation in the context of an authorized first
sale that exhausts a valid, unexpired patent is not preempted as an
impermissible attempt to contract around an objective of federal patent
331
law that underlies the patent exhaustion doctrine.
328. Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 514–15 (“The concern [regarding a patent holder’s ability to collect
multiple royalties] was most recently stated by the now vindicated district court decision in Quanta, which
justified the first sale doctrine as prohibiting ‘double’ royalties. . . . In the 1950s, . . . [however, this
concern] was largely discredited by Chicago School writers, who showed that . . . in any multi-stage
distribution chain there is but a single monopoly profit to be earned.” (paragraphing omitted)).
329. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964).
330. The Supreme Court’s decision in Brulotte stands for the proposition that an obligation to pay
royalties for the continued use of a product following the expiration of the patents embodied in the
product is per se patent misuse and, accordingly, the payment obligation is unenforceable, whether or
not the patent holder and the buyer of the patented product had agreed that extending the payment
obligation was a convenient method of reflecting the business value of the transaction. The fact that
the Court in Brulotte enforced a contract-based obligation to make ongoing royalty payments for the
post-sale use of a patented product, but required that the payments cease following the expiration of
the relevant patents, raises the interesting question of whether the Brulotte holding requires that other
types of contract-based post-sale restrictions are not enforceable through a breach of contract remedy
following the expiration (or invalidation) of the relevant patents. A comprehensive analysis of this
issue is beyond the scope of this Article. It is noteworthy, however, that while the Brulotte rule of per
se patent misuse is still good law, it has been widely criticized by both judges and commentators, and
its application has not been extended beyond the limited facts in that case. See Zila, Inc. v. Tinnell, 502
F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th Cir. 2007) (“No matter how unconvincing Brulotte’s foundation may be, . . . we
are bound to apply its holding if it applies to the case before us. At the same time, our task is not to
extend Brulotte’s holding beyond its terms. So, except as required by Brulotte and its progeny, we shall
endeavor to give effect to the intent of the parties and the bargain that they struck.”); Scheiber v.
Dolby Lab., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1017–19 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e have no authority to overrule . . . [the]
Supreme Court[’s Brulotte] decision no matter how dubious its reasoning strikes us, or even how out
of touch with the Supreme Court’s current thinking the decision seems.”). Accordingly, there is a good
argument to be made that the Brulotte rule would not be extended to limit the enforcement of
contract-based post-sale restrictions that are not royalty payment obligations.
331. The Supreme Court’s decision in Brulotte is an effective counter to a broader preemption
argument, also based on the single reward interpretation of patent exhaustion, that can be made
against the enforcement of any contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product under state
law. According to this argument, the doctrine of patent exhaustion is intended to prevent a patent
holder from receiving multiple rewards with respect to the authorized sale of its patented product,
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Returning to the single-use only restriction, the next issue to address
in assessing its enforceability under state contract law is whether the
inclusion of the restriction in a contract constitutes patent misuse. Recall
that in Part II.A.2 we concluded that the doctrine of patent misuse does
not render every contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented product
unenforceable under state law. We reviewed the Supreme Court’s decision
in Motion Picture Patents and concluded that the Court in that case applied
the exhaustion doctrine to eliminate patent infringement remedies and
relied on the misuse doctrine to void a contract-based post-sale restriction
on a patented product, but only after an assessment of the nature and
impact of the particular restriction under consideration. The post-sale
restriction in Motion Picture Patents was a tying obligation, and the
question before us is whether a single-use-only restriction raises problems
that are comparable to those raised by a tying obligation from a patent
misuse perspective. As discussed in Part II.B.1, the Federal Circuit has
provided a means of addressing this question with its analytical framework
for a finding of patent misuse.
In fact, the approach to patent misuse summarized by the Federal
Circuit in Virginia Panel was based largely on that court’s prior opinion
in Mallinckrodt, where it considered the enforceability of the single-use
332
only restriction. In adopting the conditional sale doctrine, and thereby
dispensing with the patent exhaustion issue, the Federal Circuit in
Mallinckrodt was able to reframe the question before it as one of patent
misuse. As the Federal Circuit stated, the “appropriate criterion [in
assessing the enforceability of the single-use-only restriction under
consideration] is whether Mallinckrodt’s restriction is reasonably within
the patent grant, or whether the patentee has ventured beyond the patent
grant and into behavior having an anticompetitive effect not justifiable
333
under the rule of reason.” In the end, the Mallinckrodt appellate court
failed to answer the questions it had posed but instead remanded the case
to the district court for reconsideration in accordance with its guidance.
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Mallinckrodt provided
the basis for an argument in support of the enforceability under state law

whether or not such rewards come in the form of multiple royalty payments. Yet, a patent holder who
is paid for the sale of its product and subsequently obtains breach of contract damages from a buyer
that fails to honor a contract-based post-sale restriction is, in fact, receiving multiple rewards. Viewed
from this perspective, an action to enforce a post-sale restriction under state contract law could be
considered an impermissible attempt to contract around a patent law objective underlying patent
exhaustion that should be preempted. As in the case of the argument against a double royalty
obligation, however, this broader argument is incompatible with the Supreme Court’s Brulotte
decision, which affirmed the enforcement by a state court of a contract obligation placed on the buyer
of a patented product to provide multiple rewards to a patent holder (in the form of an initial payment
on the sale of the patented product followed by multiple royalty payments based on the use of the
product), despite the exhaustion of patent infringement remedies as a result of an authorized first sale.
332. See Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
333. Mallinckrodt v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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of the single-use only restriction, although the argument must
accommodate our conclusion, not shared by the Federal Circuit in
Mallinckrodt, that the applicable patents were exhausted by Mallinckrodt’s
authorized first sale of its patented medical device. In Mallinckrodt, the
Federal Circuit presented its patent misuse analysis in the context of a
conditioned authorized first sale that, in its view, did not exhaust the
relevant patents. Because we have rejected Mallinckrodt’s conditional
sale doctrine, an argument that relies on language in the Mallinckrodt
decision to conclude that a single-use only restriction does not constitute
patent misuse must reach that conclusion, despite the exhaustion of the
relevant patents.
The Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt began its misuse analysis by
noting that a single-use only restriction was not one of the examples of
334
per se patent misuse recognized by the Supreme Court. The court did
not find it necessary to make the obvious point that the single-use only
restriction was not protected from a misuse challenge under § 271(d)(5),
so it next addressed the question of whether the single-use only
335
restriction “is reasonably within the patent grant.” In intimating that
that was indeed the case, the court noted that restrictions “on use are
336
judged in terms of their relation to the patentee’s right to exclude,” and
337
that such “right to exclude may be waived in whole or in part.” Taken
together, these statements suggest that the single-use only restriction
placed by Mallinckrodt on its buyers was “reasonably within the patent
338
grant” conferred upon Mallinckrodt that enabled it to exclude others
from any unauthorized use of its patented medical device. The required
modification to accommodate our rejection of the conditional sale doctrine
is to add the qualifier that the restriction was reasonably within the patent
grant at the time of the authorized first sale when the patent holder made the
restriction a condition of the sale. The sale would exhaust patent remedies,
but not breach of contract remedies that could be sought against a buyer
that failed to honor the restriction. This interpretation is consistent with
our conclusion in Part II.A.2 that the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Automatic Radio, Zenith, and Brulotte allow for the placement of a
contract-based restriction on a product outside the limits of the patent
monopoly that is enforceable through a breach of contract remedy, at
339
least until the relevant patent expires or is invalidated.

334. Id. at 701 (“The restriction here at issue does not per se violate the doctrine of patent
misuse.”); id. at 708 (“[T]his is not a price-fixing or tying case, and the per se . . . misuse violations
found in the Bauer trilogy and Motion Picture Patents are not here present.”).
335. Id.
336. Id. at 706.
337. Id. at 703.
338. Id. at 708.
339. See supra note 330.
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The Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt went on to note that even if the
patent misuse analysis of a contract restriction should “lead to the
conclusion that there are anticompetitive effects extending beyond the
patentee’s statutory right to exclude, these effects do not automatically
impeach the restriction [since] [a]nticompetitive effects that are not per
se violations of law are reviewed in accordance with the rule of
340
reason.” Here again we need to add the qualifier that the restriction
would result in anticompetitive effects extending beyond the patentee’s
statutory right to exclude at the time of the authorized first sale when the
patent holder made the restriction a condition of the sale, but can
otherwise rely on the language in the Mallinckrodt opinion. While the
Federal Circuit left the rule of reason analysis to the district court on
remand, it indicated that public policy considerations were relevant to
such an analysis and could militate in favor of enforcing the restriction.
In making this last point, the Federal Circuit cited a First Circuit case that
held that a “single use only restriction based on safety concerns [was] not
341
patent misuse.” The Federal Circuit was clearly mindful of the fact that
in Mallinckrodt the reconditioned medical devices at issue were not tested
for any biological or radioactive contamination prior to being returned to
342
hospitals for reuse and the fact that Mallinckrodt had indicated that it
had imposed the single-use only restriction “based on health, safety,
343
efficacy, and liability considerations.” Such considerations could have
caused Mallinckrodt to raise its prices in anticipation of multiple liability

340. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708.
341. Id. at 708–09 (citing Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 237 F.2d 428, 436–37 (1st Cir. 1956)). In Marks,
the First Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling that actions by the patent holder in restricting the use
of spectacle-like three dimensional viewers did not constitute patent misuse.
Polaroid justified these restrictions on the ground that reuse by the public generally
might spread eye infection for which perhaps it might be held liable, and in the case of the
temporary viewers, that after one use they were likely to become bent or dirty and hence
lose some if not all of their effectiveness. The District Court found that there was ground for
some ‘rational fear of infection and the spread of disease’ from the indiscriminate reuse of
viewers of both types by the general public which Polaroid could well feel it ought to take
measures to guard against. But it also recognized that the restrictions if observed
guaranteed an expansion of Polaroid’s business. ‘However,’ the court said, ‘on the facts of
this case, where there appears to be present countervailing public policy considerations, I
cannot hold that the practices employed by the defendant in connection with the sale of
viewers constitute such a misuse of patents as to compel this Court in good conscience to
deny the defendant relief on its counterclaim.’
The matter lies primarily in the discretion of the District Court. Under the circumstances
outlined above we cannot find that in this instance the court abused its discretion.
Id. at 436–37.
342. See Part I.C.1 for a review of the facts in Mallinckrodt.
343. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 703; see id. at 702 (“[T]he purpose of this [single-use-only]
restriction is to protect the hospital and its patients from potential adverse consequences of
reconditioning, such as infectious disease transmission, material instability, and/or decreased
diagnostic performance.”).
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claims or keep its patented device off the market to avoid such claims and
to protect its goodwill—actions which, arguably, would harm competition.
The next issue to address in our recommended analysis for
determining the enforceability of a contract-based post-sale restriction
under state law is whether the restriction violates federal antitrust law.
Admittedly, this step in the analysis overlaps the assessment of whether
the restriction under consideration constitutes patent misuse. As noted in
Part II.A.2, the Federal Circuit’s patent misuse jurisprudence has been
criticized for conflating the misuse doctrine, as articulated by the
344
Supreme Court, and antitrust analysis, by requiring a showing of
anticompetitive effect and a rule of reason analysis for a finding of patent
misuse. The case law has failed to demonstrate a clear distinction
between a rule of reason analysis that is required for a showing of patent
misuse and one that is required for demonstrating an antitrust
345
As the Seventh Circuit noted in USM Corp. v. SPS
violation.
346
Technologies, Inc., in discussing the evidence required for the finding
of an anticompetitive effect in a patent misuse analysis, “we have found
no cases where standards different from those of antitrust law were
347
actually applied to yield different results.” In fact, in providing its
analytical framework for a finding of patent misuse, the Federal Circuit
348
in Virginia Panel relied on State Oil Co. v. Khan, a vertical restraint
antitrust case that was discussed in Part II.A.3, for a description of the
349
appropriate rule of reason analysis. However, despite the considerable
overlap in approach, a separate antitrust analysis is required to assess the
enforceability of a contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented
product.
350
The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Princo highlights the
importance of this conclusion with its ruling that an antitrust violation
344. See supra notes 265, 271.
345. See Daniel J. Matheson, Patent Misuse: The Questions That Linger Post-Princo, A.B.A.
Section of Antitrust Law—Intellectual Property Committee, IP Committee Alert: Patent
Misuse, Apr./May 2011, at 4 (“Since 1986 [when the Federal Circuit issued its ruling in Windsurfing],
patent misuse doctrine has largely—and sometimes explicitly—incorporated antitrust analysis.
Indeed, . . . the practical application of the rule of reason is similar in the misuse and antitrust
contexts.”); see also infra note 347.
346. 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982).
347. Id. at 512. (“One still finds plenty of statements in judicial opinions that less evidence of
anticompetitive effect is required in a misuse case than in an antitrust case. But apart from the
conventional applications of the doctrine [to fact patterns that mirror those in the Supreme Court’s
patent misuse decision involving tie-ins, post-expiration royalties, and coerced total sales royalties,] we
have found no cases where standards different from those of antitrust law were actually applied to
yield different results. . . . If misuse claims are not tested by conventional antitrust principles, by what
principles shall they be tested? Our law is not rich in alternative concepts of monopolistic abuse; and it
is rather late in the day to try to develop one without in the process subjecting the rights of patent
holders to debilitating uncertainty.” (citation omitted) (paragraphing omitted)).
348. 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
349. See Part II.B.1.
350. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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can be found in the context of a patent misuse challenge that does not
351
result in a finding of patent misuse. Accordingly, the single-use only
restriction that we have selected for our enforceability analysis must be
reviewed under the Supreme Court’s case-by-case, rule of reason
approach to evaluating vertical restraints that are potentially in violation
of federal antitrust law, as discussed in Part II.A.3. Such a review may
involve an added focus on market power, since the courts have held that
the “first requirement in every suit based on the Rule of Reason is
market power, without which the practice cannot cause those injuries . . .
352
that matter under the federal antitrust laws.” It is unlikely, however,
that the rule of reason analysis of the single-use only restriction on the
patented medical device under consideration in the Mallinckrodt case
would result in a different outcome than that reached in the patent
misuse analysis.
The final issue to address in our enforceability analysis is whether
there are any public policy considerations that would militate in favor of
enforcing the restriction under consideration. As is apparent from our
evaluation of a single-use only restriction on a patented medical device,
this issue is integrated into the other steps in our recommended analysis.
As discussed above, additional policy considerations such as the ones
raised in the Mallinckrodt case regarding a concern for public safety and
for the protection of the goodwill of a business can tip the balance in
favor of the enforcement of a contract restriction under the Lear
approach to patent law preemption. Moreover, the Federal Circuit in
Mallinckrodt considered the issues of public safety and business goodwill
as relevant to a rule of reason analysis, which is an essential component
of a patent misuse or antitrust challenge. In this regard, it is noteworthy
that concerns for the safety of the public and for the preservation of the
goodwill of a business have been relied on by courts in enforcing selected
personal property servitudes, which restrict a buyer’s use or disposition
of a product even in the absence of a contract with the seller and which
are generally disfavored as restraints of trade and restraints on
alienation—as discussed in Part II.A.3.
3.

The Relative Benefit of a Breach of Contract Remedy
Post-eBay

In Part I, we concluded that the authorized first sale of a patented
product exhausts patent infringement remedies, and that such remedies
cannot be preserved by placing a restriction on a buyer’s use or
351. See supra note 269.
352. Menasha Corp. v. News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., Inc., 354 F.3d 661, 663 (7th Cir. 2004); see
Eastern Food Servs., Inc. v. Pontifical Catholic Univ. Servs. Ass’n., 357 F.3d. 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004)
(“Virtually always, anti-competitive effects under the rule of reason require that the arrangement or
action in question create or enhance market power—meaning the power to control prices or exclude
competition.”).
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disposition of the product as a condition of the sale. In this Part, we have
argued that at least some contract-based post-sale restrictions on a
patented product can be enforced through a breach of contract remedy.
We are left, then, with a question as to the relative benefit to a patent
holder of a breach of contract remedy as compared to a patent
infringement remedy, and this question is all the more significant in light of
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
353
L.L.C. regarding the availability of injunctive relief upon a finding of
patent infringement.
Prior to eBay, patent holders preferred to enforce restrictions on their
products through patent remedies because the Federal Circuit had created
a general rule that “an injunction will issue when infringement has been
354
adjudged, absent a sound reason for denying it.” Thus, by proving
infringement, patent holders often received injunctions that allowed them
to either leverage better licensing deals for their patents or achieve
increased market share.
In eBay, a jury found eBay guilty of willfully infringing patents
355
assigned to MercExchange. After upholding the jury’s verdict, the
Federal Circuit reiterated its rule that, once infringement was found, an
injunction should issue unless the injunction would injure the public
356
interest. Because the Federal Circuit found no “exceptional” and
persuasive reason to deny a permanent injunction, it granted the
357
injunction. But the Court criticized and overruled the Federal Circuit’s
358
“general rule.” The Court noted that the Federal Circuit’s “general
rule,” unique to patent disputes, was misapplied and that injunctions in
patent cases, as in other cases, “may issue in accordance with the principles
359
of equity.” The Court held that the proper test is the traditional fourfactor test, in which
a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages,
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
360
disserved by a permanent injunction.

Demonstrating how this test would shift the granting of injunctions in
patent cases, the district court, following remand, refused to grant an

353. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
354. Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citing W.L. Gore &
Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
355. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
356. Id. at 1338 (“[T]he general rule is that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement
and validity have been adjudged.”).
357. Id. at 1339.
358. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006).
359. Id. at 392 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006)).
360. Id. at 391.
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361

injunction. The district court held that the Supreme Court’s eBay
decision had overturned the presumption of irreparable harm, placing the
362
burden to prove irreparable harm on the plaintiff. Then, applying the
four-factor test, the district court found (1) there was no irreparable
harm because MercExchange continued to license its patents and lacked
363
significant commercial activity; (2) money damages were an adequate
remedy because the court felt MercExchange would only use a
permanent injunction for negotiating leverage, meaning that it was not
364
deserving of an equitable remedy; (3) the balance of hardships favored
365
neither party because of marketplace uncertainty; and (4) the public
interest weighed slightly against the issuance of an injunction because the
MercExchange patent was a business method patent, many of which are
of a questionable nature, while eBay’s online marketplace substantially
impacts the U.S. economy and eBay was successful prior to any alleged
366
infringement. Thus, eBay effected a shift away from a presumption in
favor of injunctions, making them more difficult for a plaintiff to obtain.
In the years following eBay, courts have adopted the same test to
367
determine injunctive relief in both patent and non-patent cases. Thus,
the difference in achieving injunctive relief in patent and non-patent
causes of action is smaller today than it has been historically, blunting the
368
impact of using contractual-based remedies in lieu of patent remedies.
As an example, in O.D.F. Optronics Ltd. v. Remington Arms Co., a
preliminary injunction against resale of one of ODF’s products was issued
against Remington based on violation of contract, despite the fact that
ODF’s sale to Remington exhausted any patent remedies with respect to
369
the product in question. Therefore, the likelihood of receiving an
injunction may not be significantly different as a contract-based remedy
as opposed to a patent-based remedy.

361. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. Va. 2007).
362. Id. at 568–69.
363. Id. at 570–71.
364. Id. at 582–83.
365. Id. at 583–84.
366. Id. at 586–87.
367. See Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent
Injunctions, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 203, 205 (2012) (“Within a half decade, the four-factor test from eBay
has, in many federal courts, become the test for whether a permanent injunction should issue, regardless
of whether the dispute in question centers on patent law, another form of intellectual property, more
conventional government regulation, constitutional law, or state tort or contract law.”); Hovenkamp,
supra note 8, at 543 (“[U]nder the Supreme Court’s eBay decision, injunctions are to be issued for patent
infringement only when the plaintiff meets the same criteria as apply to equitable actions generally.”).
368. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 543 (“It is not obvious today that the right to an injunction
to enforce a post-sale restraint via patent law would be any broader than the right to enforce it by a
contract suit.”).
369. O.D.F. Optronics Ltd. v. Remington Arms Co., 08 Civ. 4746, 2008 WL 4410130, at *1
(S.D.N.Y Nov. 9, 2008).
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Further, damages from contract-based remedies will not necessarily
be so different from those from patent-based remedies. Generally, in
contract cases, expectation damages are recoverable, although the
remedy provided to a nonbreaching party may be in the form of reliance
370
or restitution damages. Meanwhile, in patent cases, damages for past
infringement are intended to compensate the claimant for the
infringement and can reflect lost profits, but must be no less than a
371
reasonable royalty. Moreover, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s
eBay decision, the Federal Circuit has concluded that a payment
obligation for ongoing patent infringement in lieu of an injunction may
372
be appropriate under some circumstances. In the context of a breach of
an enforceable contract-based post-sale restriction on a patented
product, the breach of contract damages may be very similar to
infringement-related damages, were they available, in that evidence of an
agreed-to sale price in the absence of the restriction could serve as a
reasonable basis for the calculation of either breach of contract damages
or infringement-related damages. And while contract law does not have
any provision similar to the patent law’s willfulness provision, monetary
damages recovery from contract-based causes of action can still be
significant.

Conclusion
The Quanta decision, the Supreme Court’s latest opinion regarding
the doctrine of patent exhaustion, failed to resolve two issues of
importance to a patent holder who intends to control the post-sale use or
disposition of its patented product: (1) whether a patent holder can
preserve its patent infringement remedies by placing a contract-based
restriction on the buyer of its product as a condition of an authorized
first sale, and (2) whether breach of contract remedies are still available
to the patent holder even if an authorized first sale exhausts patent
infringement remedies. Based on our review of the relevant case law, we
have concluded that the authorized first sale of a patented product
exhausts patent infringement remedies and that the conditional sale
doctrine, which holds that patent infringement remedies can be
preserved through conditioning the sale of a patented product, is no
longer good law. And even if one accepts, for the sake of argument, that
the status of the conditional sale doctrine has yet to be fully resolved,
there is sufficient doubt as to its viability to justify our focus in this Article
on the enforceability of contract-based post-sale restrictions on a patented

370. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 839–55 (Little, Brown & Co., 2d ed. 1990).
371. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); see Chisum, supra note 178, § 20.03 (Remedy of Monetary Relief).
372. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Under some
circumstances, awarding an ongoing royalty for patent infringement in lieu of an injunction may be
appropriate.”).
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product through a breach of contract remedy. Our analysis indicates that
at least some contract-based post-sale restrictions are enforceable through
a breach of contract remedy, and we have presented a case-by-case
approach to identifying those post-sale restrictions that would be
enforceable. We end our analysis by noting that the distinction between a
breach of contract remedy and a patent infringement remedy has
diminished in the wake of the Supreme Court’s eBay decision, blunting the
impact of using contract-based remedies in lieu of patent remedies.

Table 1: Supreme Court Patent Exhaustion Cases373
Case
Bloomer v. McQuewan,
55 U.S. 539 (1852)

Authorized

Patent

Restriction

Sale

Exhausted

Enforceable

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Patent Holder

Yes

Yes

No

Patent Holder

Yes

Yes

No

First Sale By
Patent Holder

Chaffee v. The Bos. Belting Co.,

No Evidence of a

63 U.S. 217 (1859)

First Sale

Bloomer v. Millinger,
68 U.S. 340 (1863)

375

Patent Holder

Mitchell v. Hawley,

Manufacturing

83 U.S. 544 (1872)

Licensee

Adams v. Burke,
84 U.S. 453 (1873)
Boesch v. Gräff,
133 U.S. 697 (1890)
Hobbie v. Jennison,
149 U.S. 355 (1893)
Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed
Co., 157 U.S. 659 (1895)

Patent Holder

374

376

Party Authorized
to Sell in
377

Germany

373. See supra note 14.
374. The Court in this case concluded that there was an authorized first sale in the sense that the
alleged infringer was granted the right under the applicable patent to make and use the patented
machine, and in constructing and using said machine pursuant to that right the alleged infringer legally
obtained title to the machine. See supra note 7.
375. The Court in this case determined that there was no evidence that the patent holder had sold,
or granted any right or license to, the patented product to the alleged infringer providing the latter
with legal title to the product. 63 U.S. at 219.
376. The facts of this case were similar to those in Bloomer v. McQuewan. See supra note 374.
377. The Court in this case addressed the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. patent exhaustion doctrine.
The first sale under consideration was made by a party authorized to sell the product only in Germany,
and the seller was not a licensee under the U.S. patentee’s German patents. The Court concluded that
such a sale was not an authorized first sale with respect to the U.S. patents covering the product.
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Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.,
224 U.S. 1 (1912), overruled by
Motion Picture Patents Co. v.

378

Patent Holder

Yes

No

Yes

Patent Holder

Yes

Yes

No

Patent Holder

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Universal Film Mfg. Co.,
243 U.S. 502 (1917)
Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell,
229 U.S. 1 (1913)
Straus v. Victor Talking Mach.
Co., 243 U.S. 490 (1917)
Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co.,
243 U.S. 502 (1917)

Manufacturing
Licensee

Bos. Store of Chi. v. Am.
Graphophone Co.,

Patent Holder

246 U.S. 8 (1918)
Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v.
Western Elec. Co.,

Manufacturing

304 U.S. 175 (1938), reh’g at

Licensee

305 U.S. 124 (1938)
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United
States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940)

Patent Holder

United States v. Univis Lens

Manufacturing

Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942)

Licensee

United States v. Masonite
Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942)

Patent Holder
Third Party

Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible

Infringer

No

No

Yes

Top Replacement Co., Inc.

-----------

---------

---------

---------

Manufacturing

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

379

377 U.S. 476 (1964)

Licensee
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG

Manufacturing

Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008)

Licensee

378. The holding in Henry is the only instance in the Court’s patent exhaustion jurisprudence
where an authorized, albeit conditional, first sale did not trigger patent exhaustion.
379. The Court in this case considered product sales by the same party both before and after it was
granted a license to manufacture and sell the patented product by the patent holder.

